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中国上市公司频繁并购现象研究
Study on Frequent Acquirers of Chinese Listed Companies
【作者】 陈瑜;
【导师】 潘越;
【作者基本信息】 厦门大学 , 投资学, 2009, 硕士
【副题名】基于管理层行为的实证解释
【摘要】 频繁并购(Frequent Acquire)是指上市公司在短时间内发生多起并购事件的行为。随着越来越多的上市公司将并购作为企业资本运营和行业整合的重要策略,频繁并购现象普遍存在于各国资本市场中,对这一现象的研究,成为当前并购研究的热点。本文在借鉴国外学者相关研究成果的基础上,从探究我国特殊体制和资本市场背景下管理层行为对企业并购决策的影响入手,结合频繁并购之后市场的短期反应和公司的长期绩效变化,构造一个分析中国上市公司频繁并购行为的研究框架。目的在于对中国上市公司频繁并购行为做出客观评价,弥补国内在这一领域研究的不足,同时也为上市公司、投资者和证券监管部门的决策提供指导性的参考意见。本文采用2002-2006年间上市公司发生的837起取得目标公司控制权的并购交易作为研究样本,其中50家公司在3年内发生至少3起以上并购,这50家上市公司构成本文频繁并购研究的对象。通过研究频繁并购类公司的短期市场反应和长期绩效表现,本文对管理层学习效应假说和过度自信假说进行实证检验。本文的研究结果表明,管理层过度自信是导致上市公司频繁并购行为的重要驱动因素,即管理层因过度自信而高估自己挑选高协同效应目标的能力,低估并购后整合的风险,从而频繁参与并购。具体表现在:第一,频繁并购类公司并购公告的财富效应呈现递减趋势,即并购阶次越高,并购的公告效应越差;第二,频繁并购类公司发生频繁并购行为后,其长期经营业绩呈现出明显的逐年下滑趋势;第三,频繁并购类公司管理层存在自我归因偏差,其首次并购的市场反应为正,当年的业绩也得到改善,这导致管理层产生过度自信并频繁参与并购交易。本文实证结果未发现支持学习效应假说的证据,这表明频繁并购类上市公司管理层的学习效应很弱,或者不存在。
【Abstract】 "Frequent Acquire" refers to the behavior of making many M&A deals in a short period.As more and more listed companies consider M&A to be an important strategy for capital operating and industry integrating,Frequent Acquire phenomenon is found in capital market of many countries,the study of this behavior has become a hot topic in M&A research.After a overall review of relative studies on Frequent Acquire,this paper proceeds from the effect of manager behavior on the decision-making about M&A under China special economy and capital market structure,combines with short-term market response and long-term financial performance,and constructs a research framework to study Frequent Acquire behavior of Chinese companies.The purpose of this paper is to make an objective assessment of Frequent Acquire behavior,and provide a reference for listed companies,investors and regulators.The researching sample of this paper consists of 50 companies which made at least 3 M&A deals in 3 years between the period of 2002-2006.The empirical results show that managerial over-confidence is an important driving factor of Frequent Acquire,in another word,over-confidence managers overestimate their ability to select high synergy targets,and underestimate the risk of integration after M&A, which enables them to take Frequent Acquire.The evidences of managerial over-confidence are as follows:First,the Wealth Effect of M&A announcement presents a negative trend that the higher the acquisition order,the worse the effect of M&A announcement.Secondly,the long-term financial performance of Frequent Acquires takes on a clear downward trend after the behavior of Frequent Acquire.Thirdly,self-attribution bias exists in the management of Frequent Acquire finns,market reaction and financial performance of their first M & A is much better than the subsequent deals.There is no evidence in empirical results to support learning hypothesis,which indicates that learning effect of frequent acquires managerial is very weak,or does not exist.
- 【网络出版投稿人】 厦门大学 【网络出版年期】2009年 12期
- 【分类号】F271;F832.51
- 【被引频次】119
- 【下载频次】791