我国上市公司定向增发与利益输送问题研究

【作者】 陈亮；

【导师】 王克敏；

【作者基本信息】 复旦大学 ， 工商管理， 2008， 硕士

【摘要】 我国上市公司中股权结构是相当集中的,现实中大股东(控股股东)可能采用各种手段通过上市公司的再融资过程进行利益输送,这既对上市公司造成危害,也同时损害了中小股东的利益。自股权分置改革以来,定向增发逐渐成为国内证券市场权益再融资的重要方式之一,一些研究认为,我国上市公司定向增发中也存在大股东的利益输送现象。本文通过对2006-2008年已实施定向增发的260家上市公司进行研究,列举了我国上市公司定向增发中与利益输送有关的若干特征,结合目前一些与定向增发相关的实证研究成果和若干最新的具体案例对我国上市公司定向增发中大股东和关联方等利益输送行为的具体表现进行了分析,并针对这些具体表现提出了相关治理对策和建议。本文对于广大投资者更好地辨识定向增发中因大股东利益输送行为带来的潜在投资风险,以及有关证券监管部门加强对定向增发中利益输送行为的治理具有非常积极的意义。更多还原

【Abstract】 The equity structure of listed companies is very closely-held in China. So large shareholders, also known as controlling shareholder or majority shareholders, may use the refinancing of listed companies for expropriate the interest of minority shareholders. Since the reform of the shareholder structure of listed companies of China, Non-public offering has gradually become one of the most important way to refinance in China securities market. Some studies suggest that there are also large shareholders’ tunneling activities in the non-public offering process.Base on the analysis of 260 non-public offering cases happened from Jan 1, 2006 to August 31, 2008 and some analysis of actual cases, this paper did a pointed research of the large shareholders’ tunneling activities in non-public offering process in China securities market, summarized some tunneling related features and concrete manifestations of the non-public offering in China. Moreover, in order to protect the interests of small and medium-sized investors, the paper given some constructive proposals and suggestions for prevent or lessen the large shareholders’ tunneling activities.更多还原