成长期企业IPO的信号传递机制研究

【作者】 刘佳；

【导师】 李明星；

【作者基本信息】 北京物资学院 ， 产业经济学， 2009， 硕士

【摘要】 中国经济持续发展,创新型经济体系逐步建立,企业的融资需求及其他对金融服务的需求将更加持续化和多元化的。随着各类投资者的进一步成熟壮大,投资需求也会日益呈现出多样化的趋势。建设多层次资本市场,积极推进创业板市场建设,为创新型和高成长性企业提供融资渠道,为创业资本提供退出渠道,建立相应的交易制度和信息披露监管制度,已成为当前中国资本市场建设的一项重要内容。本文从契约设计和博弈论的角度研究成长期企业IPO时融资顾问和外部投资者之间的信号传递机制及这一机制对相应行为人投资行为的影响等,以实现从新的角度认识资本市场信息揭露和激励功能。本文主要采用博弈论中贝叶斯估计的分析框架和机制设计理论等工具分析解决问题。首先本文通过建立一个能够在融资顾问和外部投资者之间进行有效信号传递的机制,来“解决”两者之间关于企业IPO时信息不对称的问题。这种“信号”本文选择“IPO时融资顾问持有的被投资企业的股份比例”,而这种信号机制是否存在及其是否能够有效运行的判断依据则为“在该信号存在的情况下,其能够引导相关行为人以实现市场均衡且是否能够实现均衡时总福利水平最大化”。在一些较为严格的行动顺序和信息结构的假定下,本文发现存在一个最优的“持有”比例,可以使公众投资者辨别“好的”和“坏的”企业,实现市场交易有效率,并使社会总福利水平最大化。其次本文集中分析了融资顾问能力及其声誉之间的关系,及融资顾问的“声誉”在市场均衡过程中的作用。在本部分本文认为市场信息结构又决定了“声誉”机制的有效性。最后,本文在模型分析的基础上对中国风险投资行业和创业板建设过程中的一些现象做出了解释。在政策建议方面,本文认为在中国目前资本市场环境下,投资者构成和信息结构极不合理,许多配套措施并没有达到预期效果,开设创业板会加剧风险投资领域的投机行为,不利于引导有能力的投资机构进行理性投资,最终只会造成社会资本的浪费。更多还原

【Abstract】 With The development of Chinese "innovation oriented" economy, the requirement of corporate financing activity and other financial service will be continuous and diversify. There is a signal states that the increasing strong demand of different investors will influence the investing demand to become diversity day by day. IT is a long-Term Task to build up a multi-Tier capital market, in particular, the key component is to boost the schedule to build up a Growth Enterprise market, so as To serve as a creative, and highly growing company’s financing department to provide a dynamic retreat channel. To build up a related Trading system, along with information disclosure supervisor system has been the most important mission for Chinese capital market.The paper Try To analysis the signal system performance between enterprise financing advisor and outer investors, basing on The Two aspects of Game Theory and Design of contract, in order To exploit a new perspective on the understanding of capital market information disclosure system and incentive function.First, the paper builds up a signaling game to analysis the asymmetric problem between financial advisor and outer investors. The signal in model is the holding share percentage of financial advisor after the invested company’s IPO. The paper found That under some strict assumptions about The information structure and moving sequences of The model, There will be an optimal holding percentage for a financial advisor, which can be used by outer investors To Tell "good " and "bad "companies, also with maximization of social welfare.Then the paper focuses on the relationship between ability and reputation of financial advisor. The conclusion indicates that reputation mechanism should be established in China’s stock market.In The end,The paper uses its model in To The application of explain China’s venture capital invest industry. To introduce growth enterprise market and forming a market system with the stock market as the mainstay, coexistent in harmony with other forms of securities market in China is not a wise choice under current conditions. There are still exist many problems, such as severe stock "complications", malformed stock market operation, weaken function of stock financing and resource allocation, severe stock market speculative atmosphere, investors especially medium and small shareholder lose heavily. IT is really a waste of social resource when China’s stock market is still information asymmetry, lack of effective complementary measures.更多还原