【作者】 李旭；

【导师】 曹正汉；

【作者基本信息】 浙江大学 ， 政治经济学， 2008， 硕士

【副题名】以刘鸿生企业集团（1911-1937）为例

【摘要】 本文研究的问题是,拥有个人信用的小股东在什么条件下能够获得企业控制权。本文运用案例研究和理论模型想结合的方法,尝试回答上述问题。本文首先以代理理论为出发点,系统回顾对这一问题的研究文献,并着重评述有关个人信用对企业利润和控制权的影响文献。在此基础上,指出现有个人信用与企业控制权转移的研究文献有不完善和需要改进之处。然后,本文系统地研究刘鸿生企业集团的从创办、扩张到危机的全过程,指出在这一过程中,个人信用对于刘鸿生控制企业始终发挥着重要作用,并通过对案例的分析,揭示了企业控制权向个人信用供给方转移的条件。在文献研究与案例研究的基础上,本文建立理论模型,解释个人信用对企业控制权转移的内在机制,并得出一般性的结论:在企业货币资本不足的情况下,如果企业对个人信用的需求量小于供给方可以供给的最大值时,控制权不会发生转移;当企业对个人信用的需求量超过可以供给的最大值时,企业控制权会向个人信用的供给方转移。更多还原

【Abstract】 The control right of limited company has been the focus of theoretical studies, and separate shareholders’ controlling the companies usually happen in various kind of market environments. This paper focuses on the condition in which separate shareholders with personal credit can control the company by the methods of case study and theoretical model experienced evidence, also the experienced evidences and logical reasoning.First, there is a systematical, historic review of the researches of this issue starting from agency theory, which focuses on the literatures on how individual credit effects companies’ profits and the control right. Then the writer points that this theory need improve.Second, there is the detailed introduction of the process of creation, enlargement, crisis of Liu Hongsheng’s company. The writer believe that individual credit effects significantly towards Liu’ control of the company in the process of the company’s creation, enlargement until crisis; also the writer clearly states the condition under which the control right move to individual credit supplier by case studies.In the end, on the basis on the precedors’ research results, the writer sets up the theoretical model, explains the internal mechanism how individual credit control a company, then draw a general conclusion that in the condition of shortage of enterprise capital, the control right will not move if the demand is less than the maximum supply, the vice versa.更多还原