【作者】 桑圣举；

【导师】 王炬香；

【作者基本信息】 青岛大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2008， 硕士

【摘要】 当前供应链风险是供应链管理面临的一大挑战,如何采取有效的预防和规避措施是企业和供应链研究专家面临的一大难题。供应商作为供应链的“源头”,是供应链运行的基础,他的好坏直接影响到供应链整体的运行效率。供应链收益共享契约作为供应链协调的一种重要机制,它能有效的协调供应链各成员,优化供应链系统,已经成为越来越多的企业应对日趋激烈的市场竞争的有效手段。因此本文主要进行了以下几个方面的研究:1、从供应商可能面临的外部风险因素和内部风险因素两个角度出发,构建了供应链风险管理下供应商评价体系。利用模糊集合来表示决策者给出的不确定信息,采用梯形模糊数、三角模糊数表示决策专家的判断,并考虑到决策者对评价方案的不同风险偏好以及不同决策权值,对传统的TOPSIS方法进行了改进,依据贴近度区间对供应商进行分类。2、在供应链收益共享契约机制中考虑供应链成员对风险的偏好特性,建立了具有风险偏好的优化模型和协调机制。利用期望收益方差方法,给出供应链成员持有不同的风险偏好时,收益系数的取值区间,并分析了风险偏好对收益系数、批发价格、期望收益的影响。研究结果表明:对于风险规避者来说,他们为降低自身的风险,宁愿提供给对方较大的销售份额,降低自己的收益,而让对方提供较低的批发价格;而且供应链成员承担的风险越大,其获得的期望收益也就越大。这正体现了供应链实践过程中体现利益与风险对称性原则。3、建立了模糊需求下的三级供应链收益共享契约机制模型,采用三角模糊数表示模糊信息,分析了模糊环境下分散决策和集中决策过程,给出收益共享契约机制下的决策模型。研究结果表明:通过建立供应链收益共享契约机制同样可以使供应链中各成员在模糊环境下达到“共赢”,而且结果显示,虽然实际需求环境是模糊的,但是决策结果是确定的。4、建立了存在竞争性零售商参与的供应链收益共享契约模型,模型中引入了零售商之间的价格竞争性参数,分析了零售商竞争环境下,供应链系统在分散决策、集中决策以及收益共享下的决策过程。研究结果表明:随着零售商之间竞争程度的加剧,零售商的订购量、期望收益以及供应商的期望收益会减小;而供应链收益共享契约机制同样可以保证竞争性零售商和供应商的期望收益比在分散决策下的各方期望收益有明显提高。更多还原

【Abstract】 Supply chain risk is becoming a challenge of present supply chain management,how to adopt effective prevention measures is a difficult problem that faced of the enterprise and the experts of SC.The supplier is the source of SC,which is the basis of stable operation and its performance is directly affects the efficiency of SC.The revenue sharing contract as an important mechanism of SC coordination can effective coordinate the members and optimal the system, which becomes an effective way to deal with the increasingly fierce market competition.So this paper mainly research on the following aspects.1.The evaluation system of supplier under SC risk management is constructed from the external and internal risk factors that may be faced of the supplier.The uncertain information is represented through fuzzy set and the values decision of experts are represented by trapezoidal or triangular fuzzy number.The different risk preference and weight value are considered and the TOPSIS method is improved.Their closeness coefficient distance attains the classification of the suppliers.2.Based on risk preference of partners in supply chain,the design of revenue-sharing contract is researched.The interval value of revenue coefficient is given when SC member is risk averse or risk prone.The value of revenue coefficient,wholesale price and expected profit affected by risk preference are discussed.It shows that the risk averse would let the other party derive the larger sales share in order to get the lower wholesale price and the more responsibility of risk the more revenue of the partner can derive.It reflects symmetry principle of profit and risk in the course of SC operation3.In a three-stage supply chain composed of a supplier,a distributor and a retailer,the coordination mechanism in fuzzy demand environment is researched.The parameters of demand function are regarded as triangular fuzzy numbers.The decision processes are analyzed under the decentralized and centralized decision,the decision model under revenue sharing contract mechanism is built.In the end,for directly analyze,a numerical example is given which suggests that the revenue sharing contract also can coordinate the profits of members in fuzzy demand environment.4.Based on the two retailers competition in supply chain,the decision processes of the decentralized decision,centralized decision and revenue sharing contract mechanism are analyzed.The results suggest that the order and profit of retailers,the profit of supplier,the upper limit of revenue sharing coefficients should be decrease between the more competing of retailers. It also suggests that the revenue sharing contract mechanism can coordinate the profit of members with retailer competition.更多还原