订单农业的合约有效性研究

【作者】 余睿；

【导师】 罗敏；

【作者基本信息】 贵州大学 ， 农业经济管理， 2008， 硕士

【摘要】 订单农业对于推进农业产业化进程、增加农民收入具有重要作用。然而订单农业的违约问题制约着其作用的进一步发挥。影响订单履约率的因素来自各方面,但最为主要的原因还是农户和企业的利己行为。农户和企业的合作与竞争表现为一定形式的博弈过程,如何设定他们之间的合作对策,改善他们的交易行为,使得利益与风险在农户和企业间达到平均分担的订单模式是值是深入研究的。本文从博弈论的视角并结合遵义县订单农业发展的实际经验,对“企业+农户”这种模式中企业和农户的博弈过程进行了分析,其契约的不稳定在于,履约并不是公司与农户的纳什均衡,所以契约不能够自动实施。然后结合国内订单农业发展的教训和经验,引入两种可以增强合约有效性的订单模式——“企业+中介组织+农户”和“企业+农户+期权”。用博弈论分析了在“企业+中介组织+农户”这种模式中,中介组织的引入对企业而言,其违约并不能带来更多的好处(因为中介组织的要挟诉讼是可置信的);对农户而言,机会主义行为受到限制。从而履约成为博弈的均衡,因此契约比较稳定。再用金融创新工具中的期权公式分析了“企业+农户+期权”这种模式中,农产品订单和期权理念结合,一方面农户不会丧失高收益机会,另外企业通过期权费收入也得到补偿,市场行情变动所带来的高收益机会通过期权费在双方之间进行了分配。这样就形成了利益与风险共担机制,有效约束双方的行为,保证合约的有效性。更多还原

【Abstract】 Contract agriculture plays an important role in promoting the industrialization of agriculture and increasing the income of farmers.However,the default problem prevents its effect from being given further play.Among the factors which are affecting the rate of obeying the contracts,the major reason to be considered is the behaviour of self-benefits from peasants and enterprise.The cooperation and competition between farmer and enterprise,which had been perform the way of the game-theory processing.How we setup up cooperation-plans,improve their trading in order to balance the benefits and risks between farmers and enterprise.The pattern of the contract is worth thorough research.In the text,first I analysed the processing of Game-Theory inside the ’Enterprise + Farmers’ mode basing on the Game-Theory and actual experiences of contract-agriculture development from Zunyi county.The reason for their unstable is since there’s no Nash Equilibrium in the contract;it can not be done automatically.Then after considering the experience and lessons of china contract agriculture,here present two patterns which can positively improve our contract agriculture - ’Enterprise + Intermediate Organization + Peasant Household’ and ’Enterprise + Peasants Household +Option’ In the ’Enterprise + Intermediate Organization + Peasant Household’ pattern,it can be analysed that when there is a agent organization between enterprise and peasants,obeying contract won’t do any more good to enterprise(because coerce litigation from intermediate organization can be legally trusted).As peasant, opportunism behavior is subjected to the restriction.Signing the contract become the balance of Game- Theory,so the contract is more stable than before.Next in the pattern of ’Enterprise + Peasant + Option’,analysis is made by using the option formula from financial innovation tools.The combination of farm produce orders and the theory of option can give farmer opportunities of high-profit income.On the other hand,enterprises receive compensation from option expenses.The high-profit opportunities from market changes assigned between two sides through option expenses. There become the mechanism of together undertaking benefit and risk,which can effectively control both parties’ behavior,and guarantee the smooth implement of contract.更多还原