【作者】 崔颖；

【导师】 苏宁；

【作者基本信息】 北京林业大学 ， 会计学， 2008， 硕士

【摘要】 自Berle and Means(1932)提出现代企业的特征是“所有权和经营权相分离”的经典命题之后,管理层股权激励日益成为人们关注的企业发展和公司治理中一个焦点问题。管理层股权激励是指上市公司以本公司股票为标的,对其董事、监事、高级管理人员进行的长期性激励。它是着眼于未来,把经营者的可能收益和他对公司未来成绩的贡献联系起来,是协调股东和经理人员根本利益的办法。从而成为一种有效的激发人力资源积极性和创造性的管理方式,在一定程度上消除“代理人风险”。本文在对股权激励的相关理论依据及其实践效应进行讨论和剖析的基础上展开,旨在通过实证分析的方法揭示管理层股权激励在我国上市公司应用中产生的实际效应,并根据实证分析的结果找出可能影响股权激励效应的深层次原因。在实证分析过程中,以我国2002年—2007年实施股权激励的上市公司为样本,以股权分置改革为分界线划分为股改前与股改后两个阶段,采用统计分析和使用最小二乘法对样本回归T值检验法以及进行相关性检验,在控制了企业特征等因素影响的作用后,对我国上市公司管理层持股比例与企业绩效间的关系进行了实证分析。两个阶段的研究结果为我国上市公司管理层股权激励与企业绩效间不存在显著相关性,对于这一结果产生的原因在各自阶段分别给予了解释,最后,针对制约我国股权激励效应发挥的根本性原因提出相应的建议与对策。更多还原

【Abstract】 Since Berle and Means put forward the classical thesis that mordent enterprises are characterized“ownership and management right separate from each other”in 1932, stock rights incentive on managements become the key problems in the enterprises development and corporate governance interested by people more and more. The stock rights incentive on managements means that the listed companies use their corporate stocks as target and make long stimulation to the directors, supervisors and top management. It is envisioned for the future and connect the manager’s expected return with his contribution to the company‘s future performance, which is a method that coordinate the fundamental interests between stockholders and managers. Thus, it effectively excites the enthusiasm and creativeness of human resources and eliminates the“agent risk”to a certain extent.This paper is based on discussing and dissecting theoretical basis and practice effect interrelated with stock rights incentive, intending to bring out the actual effects produced by applying stock rights incentive on managements in the listed companies by means of positive analysis and find out deep factors which could influence the effects according to positive analysis results. In the process of positive analysis, this paper research the relationship of managements stock holdings and enterprise’s performance after controlling the influence produced by factors such as enterprise character , by the sample of the listed companies which carried out stock rights incentive from 2002 to 2007 in China, dividing into former and latter stages with the stock right splitting reform, adopting descriptive statistic analysis and using least square method and correlation test and so on. Research result on two stages is that there isn’t remarkable relationship between managements stock holdings and enterprise’s performance, explain the reason to the result on each stage respectively. At last, this paper put forward relevant suggestion and countermeasures against the underlying reason that restrict the full play by managements stock holdings in our country.更多还原