【作者】 刘录林；

【导师】 吴献金；

【作者基本信息】 湖南大学 ， 国际贸易学， 2007， 硕士

【摘要】 随着中国改革开放的深入,经济的高速增长,两税分置愈来愈显示其负面作用,更凸显出两税合并的必要性和紧迫性,但两税合并历经曲折。本文分析了利益主体在两税合并中的行为和博弈关系,解释了两税合并的必然性和曲折性,给出了一个分析公共政策制定的一般过程。本文首先从国家利益角度结合中国不同阶段的国内外形势历史地辩证地分析了两税分置以及其带来的外资对中国的正负面效应,曾经利大于弊的两税分置政策越来越不利于国家的发展,得出两税合并的必然性和紧迫性。然后从中国现阶段政治经济环境下两税合并所涉及的四个主要利益方中央政府,地方政府,内资企业,外资企业的行为出发,对其关系进行博弈分析,表明由于内资企业存在搭便车行为和个体理性与集体理性的冲突,而且缺乏独立自主代表企业利益,协调集体行动的行业协会,在两税合并中还不能作为一个合格的博弈主体;中央政府,地方政府都有调整外资优惠政策,最终对外资实行国民待遇的愿望,但是中央政府与地方政府在引资收益中存在很大的差异,地方政府希望给予外资更高的优惠水平,引进更多的外资,延缓两税合并进程,而且中央政府在政策执行中需要地方政府的合作和支持,中央政府,地方政府和外资企业三者的博弈关系尤其是中央政府与地方政府的博弈关系决定了两税合并进程的曲折。最后结合本文对两税合并进程的解释,对公共政策制定提出建议。更多还原

【Abstract】 With the deepening of China’s reform and opening upand economic growth, two -tax law more and more play its negative role, which highlight the necessity and urgency of two-tax-merger, but two-tax-merger went through twists and turns. This paper analyzes acts and Game relation of the stakeholders in the merging process of two taxes, explains inevitability .twists and turns of the merging process of the two taxes, gives a genera] analysis formulation of the public policy process.This paper, firstly, from the perspective of national interests, with China at different stages of the domestic and international situation. historically and dialectically analyze the positive and negative effects of the two-tax law and foreign investment in China. Once favorable two-tax policy more and more isn’t conducive to the country’s development, and the merger of two-tax is inevitable and urgent. Then it discussed the behavior and Game relations of the four major stakeholders—the central government, local government, domestic-funded enterprises and foreign-funded enterprises involved in China’s current political and economic environment, which shows the existence of free-riding behavior of individual enterprises ,conflict between the individual and collective rationality, absence of the independent industry association to represent enterprises interests and coordinate collective action,so domestic-funded enterprises are not qualified as a Game participant. The central government and local governments both will adjust preferential policies and implement the national treatment for foreign investors at last. But the central government and local governments are different to attract foreign investment. The local government hopes to give foreign investors more concessions, the introduction of more foreign capital and delaying the process of merging two taxes. But the central government in the implementation of the policy needs the cooperation and support of local government. The Game relations among the central government,local governments and foreign-funded enterprises, especially the central government and local government decides tortuous merging process of the two-tax. Finally this paper gives some proposals for the formulation of public policy combined with explaining the merging process of two-tax.更多还原