【作者】 莫清；

【导师】 祝焰；

【作者基本信息】 华中科技大学 ， 会计学， 2005， 硕士

【摘要】 一个有效的治理机制应当保证公司在经营不善时,能够及时更换不称职的高层管理人员,尤其是作为公司负责人的董事长和总经理。因此通过发掘公司内外部治理机制同高层管理人员变更之间的相关性,可以发现我国上市公司治理机制中存在的问题。本文在委托代理理论的基础上,以2004年度深圳证券交易所发生高层管理人员变更的公司数据为样本,研究董事会结构、股权结构、外部并购市场等内外部治理变量对我国上市公司董事长和总经理变更的影响。研究结果表明,我国高层管理人员的变更比例为24.92%,略高于国际一般水平。进一步研究各治理要素发现,董事会诸多变量中,仅有董事会会议次数同高层变更显著相关,董事会规模、独立董事比率例等对高层变更都无显著影响,表明董事会在公司治理中的监督作用尚未得到充分体现。同时,股权结构,尤其是上市公司中国有股所占比例直接影响了高层管理人员的变更,此外,同高层变更显著相关的还有外部并购市场。本文在对实证检验结果进行分析和研究的基础上提出政策建议:首先,通过加强独立董事的独立性,增加董事会会议次数,划分董事长和总经理的职责界限等一系列措施强化董事会的功能;其次在外部加速建立经理人市场;同时完善外部并购市场;最后从根本上必须贯彻改革股权结构,促进股权多元化和流通化,加大国有股减持的力度。论文最后还就研究的局限性及其原因进行了解释,并提出进一步研究的思路。更多还原

【Abstract】 A valid governance mechanism can ensure that when the company performs badly, it can change unfit top management, especially the chairmen of the boards and CEOs, who take charge of the companies. So we can find out problems in current governance mechanism by checking the relationship between the governance mechanism and the turnover of top management.Based on the principal-agent model, this dissertation empirically examines the top management turnover of listed companies in Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 2004. By using logistic model, the dissertation examines the impact of corporate governance mechanisms, including board of directors, large shareholders and managerial ownership and takeover market ,on the possibility of top management turnover. The findings show that the rate of top management turnover is about 24.92%, which is a bit higher than other countries. After further research, the results suggest that the boards fail to discipline top management with poor performance, while the shareholding structure, especially the rate of state-owned shares relates to the possibility of top management turnover, the other which can explain the possibility of top management turnover significantly is the takeover market.This dissertation also proposes some suggestions after analyzing the empirical results. Firstly we could enforce the boards by strengthening the independence of independent directors, adding meet times of the boards, separating the CEOs’ duty from the chairmen of boards so on. Secondly, we should establish market for managers. Also we should establish takeover market. At last we could reform current shareholding structure, making it more complex and circulating, and reduce the rate of state-owned shares. At the end, an explanation on the limitations of the dissertation and some advices on further research are given.更多还原