【作者】 邱锦美；

【导师】 王冲；

【作者基本信息】 四川师范大学 ， 企业管理， 2007， 硕士

【摘要】 由于我国证券市场具有新兴转轨性质,部分学者认为具有弱态有效的特征,这表明在我国证券市场上存在着信息不公开、不透明的情况,这将直接影响到证券市场监督作用的发挥。一方面,我国经济处于快速增长时期,不断涌现出新的企业,尤其随着我国政府实施鼓励和支持民营经济发展的政策,民营企业从数量到规模都有了长足的发展,证券市场上公开发行、借壳上市,以及管理层收购所形成的民营上市公司也不断增多。另一方面,由于我国证券法律法规尚不健全,对投资者权益的保护严重不足,许多民营上市公司最终控制股东利用其控制地位肆意侵害中小投资者的利益,为自己谋取控制权私人收益。其中,我国民营上市公司相当典型的一个特征是普遍使用金字塔结构来保持对上市公司的控制权,这种控制权形态使得民营上市公司最终控制人的侵害行为更难以被察觉,侵害行为的后果也就更为严重,其中“德隆系的倒塌”即新疆德隆及其控制的数家上市公司的破产就是一个典型的例证。民营上市公司如何充分利用证券市场资金配置的功能,吸引投资者的投资,扩大自身经营规模,提高企业价值;同时,证券市场监管部门又如何防止上市公司的“融资饥渴”而导致一些扭曲行为。由此可见,完善我国证券监管制度,促进上市公司治理的改进,特别是对民营上市公司的监管,是我国的一项长期任务。论文共分为五个部分,第一部分是导论,将国内外对民营上市公司控制权的研究作了系统的回顾并对研究对象的做了界定,作为后文实证研究的基础;第二部分是文章的重要部分,通过对收集样本数据的整理,对样本民营上市公司的股权结构、样本民营上市公司控制权结构、样本民营上市公司的层级持股状况作了统计,发现我国民营上市公司“一股独大”与“低控制权”的现象并存;第三部分是文章的核心部分,对样本公司的数据进行实证研究来分析民营上市公司控制权及其控制机制对公司价值的影响,发现我国民营上市公司中第一大股东对公司价值的正面影响并不明显,金字塔持股结构所形成的持股层级及控制权与现金流权的分离对民营上市公司的公司价值负相关,流通股与非流通股的差价与民营上市公司价值正相关;第四部分针对第三部分的结论,从转轨改革、证券市场上的股权分置结构、对中小投资者保护的法律缺失、东亚文化等我国特殊的外部环境来解释民营上市公司控制权形成的原因,也即低控制权对公司价值造成负面影响的缘由;第五部分针对影响民营上市公司价值的因素,提出监督控股股东,克服控股股东道德风险行为,提升公司价值的对策。更多还原

【Abstract】 The stock market in our country has some attribute of transforming. Many scholars hold that our stock market is not efficient enough (Xiaoyue, Chen(1997);Changwen, Zhao(2000)),which shows information of the stock market is not available and transparent. So the stock market can not supervise the listed private-controlled companies. This is mainly partly because the economy in our country grows and new companies sprang, in addition to our government’s support, private-controlled companies have expanded from quantity to scale and initiated public option(IPO),manager-bought option(MBO), bought-shells(BS) listed private-controlled companies increase as well; partly because the law on the share-holder protection is scarce and many controlling share-holder in listed private-controlled companies grab illegal profits called private benefits of control from small-median share-holders .The controlling share-holder of the listed private-controlled companies hold the control rights through Pyramid structure which is a typical character of the listed private-controlled companies and it help the controlling share-holders’grabbing deeds hard to be discovered and make the grabbing more serious. The collapse of Delong-link companies, De-long ,Xinjiang, have corrupted which shows an example of our stock market. The listed private-controlled companies how to make use of stock market to raise money ,how to attract investors and expand the scale of the companies ,how to improve corporation vale ; meanwhile , the administration of the stock market how to deal with the distortion deeds of the controlling share-holder when they are lack of capital. To perfect the institution of stock market and improve the corporate governance of the listed companies especially the listed private-controlled companies is a long-term task.The paper has five parts.The first part is the introduction and it traces back the research on control right home and aboard as well as defines the objects in this paper which serve as the base of the latter part of the paper. The second part is an important part of the paper, it discovered that“the controlling shareholder”and“lower control right”exist in the same listed private-controlled companies through the statistics like the share structure ,the control right structure and the pyramid share-holding structure .The third part is the main part of the paper.Based on the assumption and the data, it found that the positive effect of the first share-holder to the company value is not so severe, the effect of the separation of control right and the cash flow right origins from the pyramid structure to the company value is negative , the effect of liquid share price and the unliquid share price to the company value is positive. The fourth part is attached to the third part and it explains the reason of the phenominom of the lower control right and the reason of the negative effect of the control right to company value from the transformation reform , the defect of the stock market ,the lack of laws and the Asian culture. The last part proposes how to supervise the controlling share-holder and how to overcome the moral hazard of the controlling share-holder to improve the company value.更多还原