【作者】 曾顺秋；

【导师】 傅强；

【作者基本信息】 重庆大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2007， 硕士

【摘要】 供应链中的合作广告,即制造商对促销其产品的零售商进行补偿,已经成为营销实践的主要组成部分,是近年来不可或缺的一种产品分销合作机制。本文在对当前的合作广告理论研究进展加以综述的基础上,主要运用博弈论和微分对策的理论与方法,分别从静态环境和动态环境两个角度出发,对由单一制造商和单一零售商所组成的两级供应链中的合作广告计划问题进行了深入地研究。首先,本文从静态环境、动态环境、竞争环境以及实证分析这四个方面对国内外的合作广告理论研究成果作了一个系统的阐述和归纳。接着对这些研究成果进行了详尽地总结和评价。其次,本文开始将注意力转移到合作广告与产品定价问题上来。分别考察了经典的制造商为领导者而零售商为跟随者的Stackelberg主从博弈情形和Nash合作博弈情形下制造商与零售商的最优广告及定价策略选择、双方最优利润及系统利润。通过对两种博弈均衡结果的比较,发现对制造商、零售商以及供应链系统乃至消费者而言,Nash合作博弈结构要严格优于Stackelberg主从博弈结构。然后,本文放宽了以往市场需求为确定性的假设,侧重讨论了随机干扰因素分别服从均匀分布和指数分布情形下的合作广告与订货及存货问题。在传统的报童模型扩展性研究的基础上,先后探讨了Stackelberg主从博弈与Nash合作博弈情形下制造商与零售商的最优行动策略和双方最优期望利润及系统最优期望利润。研究表明,Nash合作博弈均衡时的订货数量、存货水平、全国性(或地方性)广告水平以及系统期望利润都要大于Stackelberg主从博弈均衡时的相应值。最后,本文试图将对合作广告模型的研究从静态环境过渡到动态环境。充分考虑了制造商全国性广告活动与零售商地方性广告活动对品牌销售量的短期影响和长期影响。分别获得了Nash非合作博弈、Stackelberg主从博弈和Nash合作博弈这三种不同博弈结构下制造商与零售商最优反馈策略的解析解和相应的最优利润。比较发现,只要零售商广告促销对品牌商誉的负面影响足够小,那么Stackelberg主从博弈均衡下的制造商广告投入、零售商广告支出、双方各自利润以及系统利润均大于Nash非合作博弈均衡时的对应值。而且在系统利润增量分配方案满足Pareto有效可行的前提下,从渠道成员双方和整个渠道的角度看,Nash合作博弈结构要严格优于上述两种非合作博弈结构。此外,一个Nash讨价还价模型使Nash合作均衡时的系统利润增量得以合理分配。更多还原

【Abstract】 Cooperative advertising in a supply chain, i.e., the manufacturer reimburses a retailer for promoting the manufacturer’s products, has become a mainstay of marketing practice, and it also has become an indispensable cooperation mechanism of product distribution in recent years. Based on the survey of the current researches on co-op advertising, this paper mainly employs a game theory approach and the methodology of differential games to thoroughly study the co-op advertising program within the two-echelon supply chain, composed of a single manufacturer and an exclusive retailer, in the static context and the dynamic setting.Firstly, this paper systematically expounds the advances in research of co-op advertising theory from the static context, the dynamic setting, the competitive case and empirical analyses at home and abroad. Then, we sum up and evaluate these existing researches in detail.Secondly, this paper quickly turns its attention to the problem of co-op advertising and product pricing. We respectively investigate the manufacturer’s and the retailer’s optimal advertising strategies, pricing policies, expected profits and the system profits in the classic Stackelberg leader-follower game, in which the manufacturer acts as a leader whereas the retailer is a follower, and a Nash cooperative game. Comparing the equilibrium outcomes in two game situations, we find that, for the manufacturer, the retailer, the supply chain system and even consumers, the Nash cooperative game structure is strictly optimal than the leader-follower game structure.Thirdly, this paper relaxes the previous assumption that the market demand is certain. We specially discuss the problem of co-op advertising, ordering and stocking when a random factor satisfies uniform distribution and exponential distribution. Based on the extensive researches on the conventional newsboy model, We individually explore the manufacturer’s and the retailer’s optimal action strategies, both expected profits and the entire system expected profits in the Stackelberg leader-follower game and the Nash cooperative game. The results show that, ordering quantities, the stocking level, the national or local advertising rate, the respective expected profits of channel members, and the system expected profits at Nash co-op equilibrium are higher than those at Stackelberg equilibrium.Finally, this paper intends to transfer the researches on co-op advertising model from the static setting to a dynamic framework. We fully consider both short and long term impacts of the manufacturer’s national advertising and retailer’s local advertising on the products’sales volume. And we respectively obtain the closed-form solutions of the manufacturer’s and the retailer’s optimal feedback strategies, and the relevant system’s optimal profits within three different game structures which are the Nash non-cooperative game, the Stackelberg leader-follower game, and the Nash cooperative game. By comparatively analyzing, We find that the manufacturer’s advertising expenditures, the retailer’s advertising expenses, the profits for both parties and the system profits at Nash non-cooperative equilibrium are lower than those at Stackelberg equilibrium, when the negative effect of the retailer promotional effort on brand goodwill is sufficiently small. Furthermore, if the allocation scheme of the system profits gain is feasible Pareto efficient, the Nash cooperative game structure is strongly optimal than above-named non-cooperative game structures, for channel members and the overall channel. Moreover, a Nash bargaining model is utilized to reasonably allocate the system profits gain at Nash cooperative equilibrium.更多还原