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我国东西部间产业转移滞缓原因与对策的理论研究
Theoretical Study on Stagnance of Transfer of Domestic Industries between Eastern and Western Region
【作者】 刘海;
【导师】 孟卫东;
【作者基本信息】 重庆大学 , 技术经济及管理, 2007, 硕士
【摘要】 随着近年来,我国东西部地区经济差距有越来越大的趋势,中央政府提出了统筹区域发展、协调区域经济的方针。产业的区域转移则是实现区域经济协调发展的良好途径,因此,有必要对其进行理论上的研究与探讨。本文首先对我国近几年东西部间产业转移的状况进行了描述性分析,在东西部区域各选择3个代表性的省市,基于产业梯度转移理论,研究各地第二产业近几年产业梯度系数的变化趋势。这里本文得出了东部部分地区第二产业确实已出现了向外转移的苗头,但从整体来看,东西部间的产业转移还是相当滞缓。接下来,本文力图从微观层面对两区域间产业转移的滞缓进行理论上的分析。这部分建立了两个理论模型,其一是熟练劳动力分布与转移模型,分析了两区域上在市场条件下达到系统均衡时的熟练劳动力分布情况以及其向较低梯度区域转移的效用驱动;其二是厂商的选址模型,基于行业内两个厂商间相互博弈,推导出博弈均衡时,厂商的区位选择以及转移的利润驱动。就模型分析结果来看,第一个模型中最终会有大于二分之一的熟练劳动力选择聚集于同一区域,且外部条件不发生大的变化时,位于高梯度区域的熟练劳动力没有向低梯度地区转移的动机;在第二个模型中,存在集聚生产的协同效应的情况下,模型中的两个代表厂商也会选择分布在同一区域。也就是说,完全在市场条件下,高梯度地区由于其经济集聚所带来的外部性,在一定程度上阻碍了产业中劳动力与厂商向其他区域转移。鉴于此,本文引入了政府这一区域经济发展的重要因素。当然这里只是引入了政府的补贴因子,而不是由政府来强行干预经济的运行。这一部分基于进化博弈动态复制思想,建立了经济发展梯度不平等的两区域间的厂商合作模型。通过这一模型分析,本文得到合作的先决条件是合作的潜在收益足够大;另外,西部地区在合作中应在一定程度上甘于让利,以市场换技术;再者,就是地方政府应在合作的初期努力促成一些典型事例,以发挥示范效应,吸引更多的东部企业与西部企业进行合作。通过对产业转移滞缓的原因理论上的分析,以及可行的由政府引导的企业合作模型的探讨,本文在最后部分针对东部地区和西部地区分别给出了具有现实意义的政策建议。
【Abstract】 Recent years, with the widening gap between eastern and western domestic regional economy, the center government put forward the policy of overall planning development of the regional economics. The transfer of industry among districts can be a good method to achieve the aim. However, in fact, the transfer of industry within people’s expectation did not emerge on a large scale. First, we studied the status quo of domestic transfer of industries among regions. According to the analyses, we knew that the transfer of industry between eastern and western was rather slow on the whole.And then, we tried to examine reasons of the slow transfer of domestic industries between the two regions theoretically from the perspective of microeconomics. Two theoretical models were established, one being the skilled-labor-transfer-model, the other enterprise-positional-model. According to the analyses of the first model, there will be ultimately over one half skilled labors gathering in one district. And when external situations remain steady, those skilled labors at the higher gradient district do not have the motive to transfer. According to the second model, when the synergy of production is provided, the two enterprises will finally choose to reside in one district This means the synergy of production can hinder the enterprise transfer between districts. In other words, under the influence of market mechanism, the higher gradient region, which obtains the externality along with the gathering, migh hinder the transfer of labors and enterprises between districts.In view of this fact, this thesis broached the factor of governmental influence over reginal economics to later study. Therefore, the governmental subsidy factor was included, not the government dominating over the operation of domestic economy. In this chapter, based on the idea of dynamic replication of revolutionary game, we established the model of cooperation between economic enterprises in unequal gradient districts. According to this revolutionary model, we proposed that the premise of cooperation was the potential gains of cooperation being great enough. Additionally, the western region should sacrifice certain profits so as to exchange market for technology. Furthermore, the local government should set up some successful examples that could bring about the demonstration effect and attract more eastern enterprises to cooperate with western enterprises.In the last part, with the theoretical analyses of the slow industry transfer and studies on the model of cooperation between two enterprises in unequal districts, this thesis made some policy recommendations to eastern and western governments respectively which might benefit the local economy in practice.
【Key words】 Industry transfer; Regional economics; Inequality cooperation; Evolutionary game;
- 【网络出版投稿人】 重庆大学 【网络出版年期】2007年 06期
- 【分类号】F123
- 【被引频次】13
- 【下载频次】809