【作者】 余柳；

【导师】 姚禄仕；

【作者基本信息】 合肥工业大学 ， 企业管理， 2007， 硕士

【摘要】 本论文选题源于上海证券交易所第十期联合研究计划项目《中国上市公司高管人员激励机制研究》，本论文是对该课题的深化研究。上市公司高管人员激励机制问题，是当前我国上市公司治理改革实践中的一个重点问题。本文筛选了1141家上市公司2003-2005年财务数据，对高管人员薪酬进行了统计性描述和多元回归分析，发现净资产收益率和高管薪酬之间存在“区间效应”，上市公司规模和上市公司所在地区与高管人员薪酬存在显著的相关性，高管人员持股与高管薪酬无显著的相关性。在相关理论和实证分析基础上，本文提出了“基薪+风险报酬+期权”的薪酬激励模式，探讨了基薪、风险报酬、股票期权的具体操作思路和方法，并提出了相应的政策建议。更多还原

【Abstract】 The selected topic of the paper originates from the Shanghai Stock Exchange Tenth joint research projects "senior executive’s incentive mechanism of Chinese listed company ", this paper is the in-depth study on the project.Senior executive’s salary incentive mechanism of listed companies is a key issue of the current practice of corporate governance reform. This paper selects of 2003-2005 financial data of 1141 listed companies, carries on statistical description and multivariate regression analysis to senior executive’s salary. It is found that there is an "range effect" between the net rate of return on capital and senior executive salary, the size of listed companies and location of listed companies have significant relevance relation with senior executive salary, executive holding has not relevance relation with senior executive salary.Based on the analysis of the relevant theoretical and empirical research, this paper proposes a "base salary +risk reward+ stock option" mode of remuneration incentives mechanism, probes into technique of the basic salary, stock option and the risk remuneration. Then it puts forward the corresponding policy recommendations.更多还原