【作者】 沙亚军；

【导师】 王剑敏；

【作者基本信息】 山东大学 ， 应用数学， 2007， 硕士

【摘要】 供应链是一些相互独立的实体为实现某些共同目标而组成的联盟，每个节点企业在各自优势领域(如设计、制造、零售等)为供应链联盟贡献自己的核心能力，以实现优势互补、风险共担和利益共享。供应链联盟存在的目的是寻求联盟利益最大化，吸引企业组成供应链联盟的最大动因就是使自身的利益最大化。也就是说组成供应链联盟的企业是个人理性的，有着各自的利益需求，如果企业对该供应链联盟的投入没有得到应有的回报，那么必然会对供应链联盟的运作产生不利影响。由此可见，公平合理的利益分配机制是供应链联盟持久存在和稳定发展的重要基础之一，它关系到供应链联盟的成败。本文运用博弈论中合作博弈知识来探讨供应链联盟供利益分配的机制。在运用博弈论中完全信息动态博弈理论和合作博弈理论分别建立相应的模型来分析供应链联盟利益分配问题的同时考虑了供应链上节点企业以不完全加入联盟时利益如何分配问题。这样就充分考虑了以多种方式形成供应链联盟的企业的利益分配问题，更加有利于对现实经济生活的指导。全文共有五章。第一章首先通过介绍供应链联盟发展现状引出问题，明确本文的研究背景、研究的理论意义和现实意义，接着简介了研究的内容。第二章通过构建二级供应链联盟的非合作博弈模型和合作博弈模型，对二级供应链联盟的K-S解进行改进，得到更加高效公平的利益分配方法。第三章详细介绍了多人合作博弈解Shapleyvalue。第四章重点推导了Shapleyvalue在模糊合作博弈下的表达式，为不完全加入供应链联盟的企业提供了利益分配公式，很有现实意义。第五章引入评价参与企业在联盟中贡献的另一维度----Shapleyvalue的不确定性，在此基础上给出基于它的合作博弈解。这一创新很好地解决了供应链联盟中节点企业的收益与风险匹配问题，有利于联盟的稳定。更多还原

【Abstract】 Some absolute corporations on the supply chain constitute alliance in order to carry out some together goals. Each of the partner corporation has its superior fields (such as design, product and sell) and in which it contributes its core ability for the alliance in order to carry out to fill the superiority, to take the risk and to share the benefit. It is the goal of supply chain alliance to obtain the alliance benefit maximization, the attraction of the enterprises which composes the supply chain alliance is to make their benefit maximization. In other words, every enterprise is individual rational and has respective demand. If they have not receive what they expect to field, which will can be certain that will bring some disadvantage to the supply chain alliance. So we can see, the justice and rational benefit sharing is one of the most important elements to make the supply chain alliance to exist longer and develop more stably.The thesis discuss benefit assignment mechanism in supply chain alliance by utilizing cooperate game knowledge. It solve not only the supply chain benefit assignment problem by constructing their respect corresponding models of complete information dynamic game theory and cooperate game theory but also the benefit assignment problem of pitch enterprise in supply chain which incompletely join the alliance . Then, it is fully considered that benefit assignment problem of the enterprises which form supply chain alliance by some kinds of ways. It is more advantageous to instruct realistic economic life.The thesis consists of five chapters. In Chapter 1, the question is educed by analyzing the develop actuality of the supply chain alliance, and definitude this thesis’s research background, significance and contents. In Chapter 2, Non-cooperate game model and cooperate game model are constructed, and K-S solution in two levels supply chain is improved. It is proved that the solution is more effective and fair. In Chapter 3, Shapley value which is a solution of cooperates game is introduced in detail. In Chapter 4, the expression of Shapley value in fuzzy cooperate game is inferred with emphasis .It provides benefit assignment formula for those enterprise which incompletely join supply chain alliance. In Chapter 5, another dimension of appraising enterprise’s construction in alliance -Shapley value uncertainty is introduced. Then, we have one new cooperate game solution based it. The innovation has solved in well the pitch enterprise’s income and risk matching question in supply chain alliance, and is advantageous to the alliance stability.更多还原