【作者】 黄洵；

【导师】 柳经纬；

【作者基本信息】 厦门大学 ， 民商法学， 2006， 硕士

【摘要】 随着对雇员利益的日趋重视和公司社会影响力的不断扩大,在公司法中导入雇员利益保护机制的呼声也日益高涨,于是雇员持股、雇员参与公司治理等公司法中的雇员利益保护机制也应运而生。在推行公司法中的雇员利益保护机制之前,对其理论基础和实施效果进行考察是必不可少的研究步骤。本文即以公司法中的雇员利益保护机制为研究对象,展开论述。本文包括引言、正文、结语三部分,其中正文共分三章。第一章是对公司法中雇员利益保护机制的概述,首先阐述了公司雇员利益受保护的范围,然后介绍了雇员持股制度、雇员参与公司治理制度等具体的公司法中雇员利益保护机制,指出通过公司法保护雇员利益对公司组织体的运作经营构成了影响。第二章分析了公司法中雇员利益保护机制的理论基础,指出公司法中雇员利益保护机制作用的发挥,是以改变公司传统内部治理结构、让雇员参与公司经营管理的制度设计为前提的。但从其理论基础来看,都未能为雇员打破传统法人治理结构、参与公司经营管理的正当性提供直接有力的理论依据。第三章对公司法中雇员利益保护机制进行实效分析,认为无论是雇员持股制度还是雇员参与公司治理制度,在改变公司治理结构的同时,不仅没能实现加强雇员利益保护的初衷,反而对公司的运作经营造成了不利影响。而新兴的市场和社会保护机制,却因为其在路径设计上实现了与利益的直接关联,由此形成强大的动力机制,从而能够对雇员利益进行卓有成效的保护。总之,就雇员持股制度和雇员参与公司治理制度而言,不论是其理论基础上的薄弱还是实际运作中的失效,都说明这两项制度无法实现“通过公司法加强雇员利益保护”的初衷。更多还原

【Abstract】 With the emphasis on the employees’benefits protection and the expansion of the influence of corporate, more and more scholars put forward that we should protect employees’benefits through corporate law. And then the protection mechanism of employees’benefits in corporate law, such as Employee Stock Ownership System and Employee Governance Participation System, emerged as the times require. This thesis mainly focuses on the protection mechanism of employees’benefits in corporate law. The author proposes that this protection mechanism is not perfect, and we should pay attention to its side-effect while people is being allured by its advantages, on the other side, protecting employees’benefits through outside mechanism is a useful complement to traditional protection mechanism and need our further research.This thesis comprises of three parts, i.e. Foreword, Text and Epilogue. The Text further consists of three chapters.Chapter I is a brief introduction of the protection mechanism of employees’benefits in corporate law. It presents the employees’benefits which are protected. This chapter also makes an introduction of the protection mechanism of employees’benefits in corporate law, and then points out that protecting employees’benefits through corporate law will result in the change of corporate governance structure.Chapter II is an analysis of the theoretical foundation of employees’benefits protection in corporate law. It puts forward that the protection mechanism of employees’benefits in corporate law protects employees’benefits by changing corporate governance structure. However, the theoretical foundation of employees’benefits protection in corporate law, such as Corporate Social Responsibility Theory, Stakeholder Theory and so on, could not provide satisfying basis for it.Chapter III discusses the actual effect of the protection mechanism of employees’benefits in corporate law. Based on the analysis of the actual effort, it is held that both Employee Stock Ownership System and Employee Governance Participation System are ineffective. On the contrast, the actual effect of outside mechanism, especially the SA8000 is obvious and remarkable.In conclusion, in the sight of the weakness of its theoretical foundation and the invalidation of its actual effect, neither Employee Stock Ownership System nor更多还原