【作者】 王磊；

【导师】 贺琼；

【作者基本信息】 武汉理工大学 ， 会计学， 2006， 硕士

【摘要】 本文主要是讨论企业各利益相关者在业绩评价指标的影响下的策略选择问题。现代企业的特点是资产所有权和控制权相分离，企业的各利益相关者之间形成了委托一代理关系。由于委托人和代理人之间的目标函数通常不一致，双方之间利益存在着冲突，因此就产生了各利益相关者之间的博弈行为。委托代理关系下，利益相关者之间的博弈行为会受到业绩评价指标的影响。业绩评价指标的设立是企业激励计划构建中的主要环节，是设计激励机制的基础环节。作为一种新型的业绩评价指标，经济增加值(EVA)可以被引入到企业的激励机制和激励合同中。 本文在吸收、归纳和消化国内外有关企业业绩评价方面研究成果的基础上，通过运用博弈分析、对比分析和案例分析的方法来探讨企业各利益相关者在引入经济增加值后策略选择的改变。以此来分析经济增加值对各个利益主体的策略选择行为的影响，从而能更好的解决委托代理问题，同时能对我国企业处理各利益相关者之间的冲突问题时能有所启示。本文介绍了相关理论基础，包括经济增加值绩效评价体系、利益相关者理论、博弈论和委托代理理论；探讨了经济增加值绩效评价体系利益相关者的分类及其之间的博弈问题；分析了EVA体系在企业相关利益者之间博弈中说起到的作用和影响，包括EVA在企业相关利益者股东与经理人相互博弈中所起到的作用和影响、在经理与员工相互博弈中所起到的作用和影响及EVA的引入对债权人与股东之间博弈的影响。同时引入EVA的案例分析，通过对案例进行分析来探讨经济增加值指标对利益相关者博弈的影响。 本文认为经济增加值激励体系对各利益相关者之间博弈的影响是积极的、有效的。在激励机制中引入经济增加值能使经理人在追求自身利益的同时也为股东创造了更多的财富；员工会成为努力工作者为企业创造价值间接的满足了经理的目标函数；有助于减少委托代理成本；进一步的保障了债权人和投资人的利益。因此EVA绩效评价体系的引入可以使企业各利益相关者从中获益。更多还原

【Abstract】 This thesis mainly discusses that how the stakeholders choose their strategy when their gambling behavior is influenced by performance evaluation system. The modern enterprise’s characteristic is the separation of ownership and control. Under such circumstances the trust-agency relation is formed between stakeholders. Because trustee and agent’s objective function is usually inconsistent, and the existing conflict of their benefit, gambling behavior is inevitable among stakeholders. The gambling behavior of stakeholders is influenced by performance evaluation system which is the main section in the construction of enterprise incentive mechanism. Economic Value Added (EVA), as a new performance evaluation system, may introduce to the enterprise incentive schemes.This thesis focuses on analysis the change of stakeholders’ strategy after introduced EVA to the enterprise incentive schemes by game theory. Therefore we can prove the influence on different stakeholders’ motivation and behavior, and further prove the correct views of former researcher. It goes on making suggestions on coping with the trust-agency issue and conflict among the stakeholders. It mainly introduces the fundamental theory and related theory; approach agency problem in stakeholders and the reason of game analysis; focuses on the game analysis of auditing pricing based existence and development of accounting firm. Meanwhile by using EVA in the cases, it approaches to analyze and evaluate its effects upon the stakeholders’ game.Through the utilization of trust-agency theory and the gambling analysis on various stakeholders, the conclusion shows that EVA’s effects upon the stakeholders’ game is positive and effective, it can cut down the agency cost and the stakeholders can benefit by EVA system.更多还原