【作者】 吴芬；

【导师】 伍中信；

【作者基本信息】 湖南大学 ， 会计学， 2006， 硕士

【摘要】 董事会治理作为一个重要内部控制工具,一直是公司治理的核心。董事会为公司的权益资本和管理雇佣契约提供了治理上的安全措施,同其亲自参与管理相比,股东将他们的决策控制权赋予其代理人,可以更有效率的控制和监督经理层的决策,近年来,各主要市场经济国家近十年来所进行的公司治理改革也大都将董事会制度的改革置于最重要的地位。那么董事会在我国上市公司的治理效率如何,是否有效的发挥其作用了呢?由于产权结构对公司治理结构存在重要影响,为了更真实我国董事会治理效率,我们以国有控股企业与民营控股企业上市公司为研究对象,通过分析五个可量化的董事会特征指标——独立董事比例、董事持股比例、领导权状态、董事会规模、董事会会议频率对公司绩效的影响,分别检验了董事会在这两类企业中的治理现状。对2002-2004年深沪两市的非金融类国有控股与民营控股上市公司相关数据进行回归分析表明,董事会特征在国有控股企业与民营控股企业中对公司绩效具有不同的影响,董事会制度效率存在差异。具体表现在独立董事制度在民营企业的效果要好于国有控股企业;董事持股的激励效果民营企业要好于国有控股企业。董事会会议效率方面民营企业要好于国有控股企业。而对于两职状态,国有控股企业偏向两职分离有效,而民营控股企业偏向两职合一有效。基于控股类型考虑的董事会治理研究从一个微观视角反映了我国公司治理问题,不仅有利于国有控股与民营控股公司各自在治理方面的优势和劣势,促进相互学习和提高,同时通过对比研究,找到当前我国公司治理问题的根源所在,有利于后股权分置时代治理结构的制度性建设的同步推进,巩固股权分置改革的成果。更多还原

【Abstract】 Board Governance is an important tool of internal control, it has always been the core of corporate governance. Board of the company provides safety of the management for the equity capital and shareholders. Shareholders give the decision-making control to their agents, that can be more efficient in controlling and Supervising the behavior of the manager. In recent years, a lot of countries in the world put the reforms of the board at an important position. What is the status of the Board Governance in companies of China, and does it play its role effectively? Consider that Control Type is an important factor that Influence corporate governance, we analysis the influence of Board Characteristics to the performances both in State-owned enterprises and privately-operated enterprises. The five board characteristics are Board composition, Board Ownership, Board Leadership Structure, Board Size and Board Meeting. The Goal of the research is to discover the differences in Board Governance effect in State-Owned Enterprises and Privately-Operated Enterprises.Through the regression analysis of financial data of non-financial State-Owned Enterprises and non-financial Privately-Operated Enterprises in Shenzhen and Shanghai from 2002 to 2004, we find that the influence of Board Characteristics to the performances of enterprises makes a difference between State-Owned Enterprises and Privately-Operated Enterprises.we find that Independent Directors play a great role in Privately-Operated enterprises, but that is not in State-Owned Enterprises; the incentive effect of Board Ownership in Privately-Operated Enterprises is better than that is in State-Owned Enterprises; the Board Meeting is more efficient than that is in State-Owned Enterprises; as to the Leadership Structure, Two-Post Arrangement is more efficient in State-Owned Enterprises, but the Arrangement of Two Posts into One is more efficient in Privately-Operated Enterprises.This thesis reflects the Board Governance problems from a micro perspective based on the consideration of Control Type. We discover the superiority and inferiority of Board Governance both in State-Owned Enterprises and Privately-Operated Enterprises. This is propitious to solve problems of Corporate Governance and to improve the performances of the Board which will promote the Reform of the Nonnegotiable Stocks in china.更多还原