国有资产流失

【作者】 戚小波；

【导师】 吴开超；

【作者基本信息】 西南财经大学 ， 西方经济学， 2006， 硕士

【摘要】 在我国改革开放的进程中,在取得可喜成绩的同时,国有资产的流失却是全方位、多渠道、无时无刻地产生着。特别是国有企业退出市场过程中的资产流失问题引起了学者和公众的普遍关注。对国有资产流失问题的争论,在实施MBO改革后越演越烈,不同的认识直接影响到对以往改革绩效的评价和下一步改革的走向。一种观点认为,由于国有企业退出不可避免地会造成国有资产流失,所以主张“放缓”或“叫停”国有企业退出以防止国有资产流失;另一种观点认为,国有企业退出中出现国有资产流失现象的主要原因在于国有资产缺乏一个公平、公开、公正的交易环境及充分竞争的交易市场,国有资产流失与改制的类型——“内部型改制”有关,而与国有企业退出无关,所以,主张国有企业应继续退出,但是在退出过程中要保证国有资产交易程序的公开性和竞争性。笔者将在本文所构建地框架下研究国有资产流失的根源问题,以指出改革的一个逻辑方向,这是本文研究的意义所在。国有资产流失作为我国公有制企业所存在的问题的一个方面,主张产权改革的主流经济学家对其做了全方位的考察。首先,认为现行的国有资产管理体制主要存在三大弊端:一是企业国有资产笼统为国家所有,国务院代表行使所有权,但是在中央和地方,政府部门与部门之间产权责任不清,缺乏责任约束,国有资产实际处于无人负责状态。二是政企不分,职责错位。三是所有权与经营权不分,混为一谈。政府部门在企业之外以行政方式多头干预,造成“越位”,抑制了企业市场活力。致使国有资产运作低效率,同时由于企业内所有者“缺位”,弱化了产权约束,所有者权益往往被侵蚀。对国有资产流失问题根源的认识上,主流的观点认为行政性委托代理方式导致了现存问题产生。行政性委托代理是一种政治代理形式,所形成的委托代理链条是全民资产——国家——政府——企业——个人,在这个委托代理链中,政治代理从一个抽象概念外化更多还原

【Abstract】 During the process of China’s Reform and Opening-up, the loss of state-owned assets happens from time to time. Different views over this problem may directly influence the evaluation of the previous performance of our reform as well as the route of the future reform.Compared with the privately-run enterprises, there exists a more complex“commission-agent”relation in the state-owned enterprises. But the main point this essay holds is that the mainstream economists may have some problem treating the settlement of“commission-agent”problems as the logic base of the property reform in the state-owned enterprises. Because on the one hand,“commission-agent”phenomena generally exist in the market economy, which lies on the base of private property rights, and the emphases on this problem never decline; on the other hand, just as the agent problems in private economy, the opportunistic acts of agents in state-owned enterprises can be supervised and restricted as well. From this angle,“commission-agent”problems cannot be solved solely depending on the transfer of ownership forms theoretically.This dissertation tries to explain the foundation of the losses of state-owned assets from the angle of the property rights of human capitals. This dissertation holds that there exists a intrinsic conflict between the property arrangement in state-owned enterprises and the property attributes of human capitals. The gist of the property arrangements in state-owned enterprises ignores the presence of property rights of human capitals, while human capitals, with humans themselves as the carriers, have their nature attributes. From this point of view, we try to analyze the systematic losses of state-owned assets out of the low efficiency of state-owned enterprises due to the lack of the supply of更多还原