【作者】 马增华；

【导师】 董继刚；

【作者基本信息】 山东农业大学 ， 会计学， 2006， 硕士

【摘要】 在我国股票市场中,占股份总数大约三分之二的国家股和国有法人股不能上市流通,人为地造成股票市场的供求矛盾,这种股份的流动性分裂现象,即股权分置现象,导致了我国股票市场功能的缺失,使得作为有效市场重要特征的流动性失去了其资源配置手段的作用。股权分置是我国经济体制转轨过程中的产物,受到传统理论与思想的束缚,有着深刻的历史背景和必然性。本文从我国股票市场股权分置现象产生的历史背景及现状出发,依据产权理论、有效市场理论及成本效益理论,论述了股权分置现象存在的不合理性。股权分置现象所带来的市场低效率几乎是全方位的,从公司治理结构、融资行为、股利分配机制到公司绩效,股权分置都发挥了“应有”的作用。第一,股权分置对上市公司的内部治理和外部治理产生了显著影响。上市公司的战略行为充分体现在控股股东或实际控制人的决策结果之中,严重侵害了流通股股东的利益。在公司的内部组织功能方面,上市公司畸形的股权结构导致了股东大会、董事会、监事会功能无法正常发挥,公司内部组织功能缺失;约束激励机制失效,委托—代理问题严重,代理成本较高。由于我国资本市场发育的不完善,经理人市场和公司控制权市场尚未形成,国家作为国有股所有者的监督和作为社会管理者的法律监督以及银行作为债权人缺乏相关信息而监督不力等原因,外部治理机制对我国上市公司治理的作用较小。第二,股权融资给非流通股股东带来超额资本收益的同时,非流通股股东对上市公司的控制权形成隐性收益。第三,股权分置的存在使得上市公司股利分配机制失衡,股利分配政策的制定往往体现非流通股股东的利益,而中小股东没有发言权,不能按照自己的意愿选择对自己有利的政策,始终处于弱势地位。第四,由于股权分置,流通股股东与非流通股东利益存在失衡,表现在上市公司绩效方面就是流通股比例与公司绩效(本文选择了净资产收益率作为评价指标)呈显著的负相关关系,同时由于复杂因素的存在,非流通股比例与公司绩效之间并不显著。解决历史遗留的股权分置问题要尊重历史,尊重市场规律,循序渐进地解决,其最终目的是保护和拯救我国的股票市场,实现市场参与各方的多赢。股权分置改革是重大而又现实的选择,是对股票市场基础性的、制更多还原

【Abstract】 In Chinese stock market, there is a mobility division phenomenon of shares called the split of shares. The non-circulating characteristics of the state-owned shares, the state-owned institutional shares and the corporate shares, accounting for about two thirds of the total shares, artificially cause the contradiction between supply and demand of the shares and lead to the deficiencies of the stock market’s function. As a result, the liquidity, which is an important feature of the effective market, loses its function of resource allocation.The split of shares is an outcome of China’s economy system transformation. Constrained by the traditional theories and ideas, it has a profound historical background and inevitability. The paper starts from the historical background and the present situation of the split of shares, and discusses the irrationality of the existence of this phenomenon, according to Property Right Theory, Efficient Market Theory (EMT), and Cost-Benefit Theory. This phenomenon has brought about almost all-around inefficiencies, from corporate governance, financing practices, dividend distribution mechanism to the corporate performance, and has played its "should be" roles.First, the splits of shares have caused significant impacts in the internal control and external governance. The strategic behaviors of the listed companies are fully showed up in the decision-making results of the proprietary shareholders or the actual controllers. These strategic behaviors fully represent their interests and badly infringe the interests of the shareholders of the circulating shares. As for the internal structural functions, the malformed ownership structure of the listed companies lead to the abnormal function of board of shareholders, board of directors and board of supervisors. Then because of the absence of the internal structural functions, the incentive and restrain mechanism become invalidated, the principal-agent problems become serious, and the agent cost is very high.However, as for the external governance system of the listed companies, its effect on corporate governance structure is quite a little. There are many reasons for this situation, such as the imperfect of Chinese capital market, the absence of the professional manager market and the corporate controlling power market, and the inefficient supervision of the country as the owner of the state-owned shares and social governor and banks as creditors lacking of the correlative information. Second, Equity financing can bring excess capital earnings to shareholders of the non-circulating shares. At the same time, shareholders of the non-circulating shares will get hidden earnings from the corporate controlling power of the listed更多还原