【作者】 卢成尤；

【导师】 高宏贵；

【作者基本信息】 华中师范大学 ， 经济法学， 2006， 硕士

【摘要】 2005年4月11日国资委、财政部联合印发了关于《企业国有产权向管理层转让暂行规定》的通知,4月14日正式公布了《暂行规定》。此规定的出台,在学界乃至社会上引起了轩然大波,也再一次引发了关于国有企业产权改革和国有资产流失的大讨论。在许多人眼中,我国的管理层收购已经成为国有资产流失的代名词。本文认为,由于与管理层收购相关的法律、法规和配套制度的缺位,特别是我国缺乏西方国家实行管理层收购的主要条件,在实际操作当中也产生了诸如暗箱操作、侵吞国有资产的负面影响,因此,我国现阶段不能实行企业国有产权向管理转让立法。否则具有我国特色的管理层收购可能会成为少数人在光天化日之下瓜分国有资产的又一次盛宴。本文共分三大部分,各部分主要内容如下: 第一部分:管理层收购的界定。本部分的目的只是对MBO作一个简要的介绍。介绍了管理层收购的含义、理论基础以及生存环境。管理层收购的理论基础中也只是对代理成本理论作了简要的分析,而激励理论、控制权转移理论以及财富转移理论等其他理论本文均没有作出分析。生存环境中也只是简单提到了MBO生存的体制环境、法律环境和社会环境。 第二部分:《企业国有产权向管理层转让暂行规定》的评析。本部分从《暂行规定》的角度质疑我国现阶段不能实行企业国有产权向管理层转让。首先介绍了《暂行规定》出台的背景以及《暂行规定》的主要内容,并把《暂行规定》的相关内容与发达国家的相关规定进行了比较;随后分析了《暂行规定》存在的主要缺陷,主要表现在:收购主体的规定太宽泛、收购对象的规定不明确、定价和融资两个重要的问题没有进行具体规定、管理层受让的期限没有规定、信息披露的规定不具体,特别是对与定价和融资有关的信息披露的规定不完善。《暂行规定》存在的缺陷必然使转让过程中的一些不规范做法得不到有效的规制。 第三部分:阐述了我国现阶段不能实行企业国有产权向管理层转让立法的基本看法。本部分是本文的重点所在。本文主要从以下几个方面质疑了我国的企业国有更多还原

【Abstract】 China State-Owned Assets Regulatory Commission and The Ministry of Finance of the People’s Republic of China enact "Temporary Regulation of the Transfer of the State-Owned Property Right of Enterprise to Management", on April 11, 2005, which arouses the heat debates among the academic fields and society. Many people think that MBO is the substitute for the drain of the state-owned assets. This paper points out that, being short of systematic legislations and regulations related to MBO, especially the absence of important conditions of western countries’ MBO, and more importantly, the application of MBO in China has caused some negative effects like black case work, theft of state owned assets, the transfer of the state-owned property right of enterprise to management can not be legislated, or it will be another great banquet for management to plunder state-owned assets. There are three parts in this paper, the following is the general introduction of each parts.Part one: Introduction of the developed countries’ MBO. This part briefly accounts for the implications of the MBO, its theoretical basis and its existing conditions. This part only analyzes the agency costs theory, rather than incentive theory, the transfer of controlling rights and wealth theory, and briefly mentions the economic system conditions, the legal conditions and social conditions.Part two: Analysis of the temporary legislation the transfer of the state-owned property right of enterprise to management. This part, from the prospect of Temporary Regulations, questions the transfer of the state-owned property right of enterprise to management. This part at first accounts for the background of the "temporary legislation", its main contents and compares the relative contents with the developed countries. And then explore the defects of the "temporary legislation ", including purchaser, purchased objects, financing, pricing, information disclosure. These defects cause illegal operations can not be regulated.Part three: Nowadays the transfer of the state-owned property right of enterprise to management should not be legislated. It is the important part in this paper. This part questions the regulations from the following points: including the wrong ideas of thelegislation, the transfer of the state-owned property right of enterprise to management will break the constitution, lack the conditions of the developed countries’ MBO, the barrier of the existing law, the legal rights of the employee will bi damaged and the inherent defects of the MBO. In this part, this paper points out in detail that China nowadays lack the existing main conditions of the developed countries’ MBO, such as personal ownership, market economic legal system, management, financing, social faithful system, intermediate organizations, social cultural environment, and what is more, this part also accounts for the existing wrong ideas, the break of constitution and protection of employee’s legal rights.更多还原