【作者】 朱恩磊；

【导师】 戚聿东；

【作者基本信息】 首都经济贸易大学 ， 工商管理学， 2006， 硕士

【摘要】 为激励以股权高度分散为特征的现代股份制公司的经营者努力、尽职工作,管理层股权激励政策自上世纪后半叶起在西方发达市场经济国家得到了广泛的认同与推广。在我国,伴随着对公有制多种实现形式的积极探索,以股票期权和管理层持股为代表的激励约束机制也正在或将要被引入到对众多国有企业的公司治理结构改革中来。 尽管国内外学者对股权激励机制的理论与实证分析已经在过去的几十年中取得了相当丰硕的研究成果,但是对这一制度选择在现实中的实际执行效果依然存在着较大的争议。特别地,在我国尚处于经济体制转轨过程中,并且存在诸多历史遗留问题的特殊条件下,管理层股权激励制度是否应当被全方位地推广,就成为一个值得深入探讨的问题。 本文从市场主体所面临的不确定环境出发,综合考虑企业面对的外部市场竞争条件与内部经营者所具有的个体因素的双重差异,运用不确定性条件下决策理论,先后构建基于传统的固定工资报酬模型和基于绩效的股权激励模型,得出市场竞争环境是决定股权激励政策有效性的根本因素这一结论——即在竞争性市场条件下,管理层股权激励政策对国有企业经营管理人员有效;而在垄断性市场中,管理层股权激励制度可能无效。 在理论分析的基础上,本文以分行业随机抽取的我国国有上市公司为样本,运用计量经济学分析方法构建回归模型,对所得理论假说进行实证检验。经检验,上述理论分析结论在一定程度上为我国资本市场中企业的实际经营行为所证实,在不同的市场竞争条件下,管理层股权激励制度所发挥的作用存在显著的差异。 据此,本文建议:当前我国国有企业改革在调整产权结构的基础上,当务之急是应当全方位地引入市场竞争机制。这一机制既包括来自产品市场的竞争,也包括来自资本市场以及职业经理人市场的对企业控制权的争夺等因素。更多还原

【Abstract】 To stimulate the executives in highly dispersed corporations work scrupulously and conscientiously, managerial ownership incentive mechanism has been widely acknowledged and implemented in western developed market economies since the last half of 20th century. Domestically, with the exploration of various means to actualize communism, ownership incentive mechanism, such as stock options, managerial ownership and so on, is being or will be introduced to the process of state-owned enterprises reform.Even if a number of theoretical and empirical accomplishments concerning managerial ownership have been achieved through the study of scholars around the world, it is still in fierce argument that what it brings to us in real corporate operation. In China, particularly, under the background of economic transition and with various unique and inherited issues, it is worthy thorough analysis that whether we should carry out this mechanism universally in state-owned enterprises.Specifically, starting with the uncertain environment faced by corporations, this thesis comprehensively takes market competition and individual risk preference into account. By applying the theory of decision-making under uncertainty, it constructs the traditional fixed-salary model and newly introduced performance-based income model subsequently, and draws the conclusion that it is market competition, but not ownership structure, matters in the determination of the effectiveness of managerial ownership incentive mechanism, i.e. managerial ownership works in highly competitive markets but does not in monopolistic environment.Furthermore, by drawing samples randomly at the basis of industrial separation and applying basic econometric regression method, this paper verifies that, to a certain extent, the previous theoretical hypothesis is illustrated by real corporate operation behaviors in domestic capital markets.Consequently, this essay suggests that it is imperative to introduce market competition in the process of ownership restructure, and that the competition should come from product markets, capital markets and professional-manager markets, etc, simultaneously.更多还原