【作者】 周晓敏；

【导师】 陶存文；

【作者基本信息】 对外经济贸易大学 ， 金融学， 2006， 硕士

【摘要】 本文以信息经济学中的不对称信息理论为基础,主要探讨了在我国保险市场上的信息不对称产生的原因以及由此引发的两个主要问题——逆向选择和道德风险。文中从保险人的角度,以它与其他各保险市场主体(投保人、保险监管人、保险中介人)之间的信息不对称关系为切入点,对各主体之间的利益冲突、对策模型的均衡解分别进行了研究分析,并根据我国的具体情况,针对不同保险市场主体之间的信息不对称问题提出了现实可行的解决方案:不仅要从保险企业的内部加强控制,而且要强化保险企业的外部约束,加快完善保险市场整体环境的建设。这些建议对于减少和防范信息不对称给保险市场带来的负面影响有着重大的现实意义。更多还原

【Abstract】 The paper studies causes of asymmetric information and two major problems——adverse selection and moral hazards rising from asymmetric information in China’sinsurance market, based on the asymmetric information theory of informationeconomics. It chooses asymmetric information relationships between insurer andother parts (applicant, supervisor, intermediary) in insurance markets as breakthroughpoint from insurer’s standpoint, discusses their clashes of interests and equilibriumsolutions to the countermeasure models. At last, according to the specificcircumstances, the paper brings forward feasible solutions to asymmetric informationproblems caused by subjects of China’s insurance market, including: tighteninginsurer’s internal control, strengthening insurer’s external constraint, quickly buildingup better insurance market environments. These suggestions have great realisticmeaning to reduce and avoid adverse impacts from asymmetric information ininsurance market.更多还原