特许经营双边治理模式研究

【作者】 王丹；

【导师】 王智慧；

【作者基本信息】 对外经济贸易大学 ， 企业管理， 2006， 硕士

【摘要】 特许经营这种新兴商业模式在社会生活中的作用越来越突出,截至2004年底,我国特许体系已突破2,000个,成为世界上特许体系最多的国家,而特许双方的合作情况却不尽人意,特许方和(或)加盟方的利益时常受到侵害,因此研究特许双方机会主义行为的治理模式具有重要意义,在此背景下本文将“特许经营的双边治理模式”作为研究课题。本文在总结前人现有研究成果并分析其不足的基础上,提出特许双方在是否采用(或参与)特许经营这一问题上的决策过程中主要考虑的变量是系统风险和交易成本,即特许方根据这两个因素确定特许体系中加盟店和直营店所占的比例;而加盟方则根据这则两个因素决定是加盟特许体系还是自主创业,并据此建立特许方和加盟方决策模型。本文通过案例分析总结出特许双方的机会主义行为主要分为契约前的逆向选择问题和契约后的道德风险问题。契约前逆向选择问题的治理可以通过特许方的资格审核和规范信息披露机制来实现;通过对特许双方的博弈分析本文认为对双方的契约后的道德风险问题的治理可以通过建立“信誉激励机制”和“失信惩罚机制”,以及提高双方合作的专用性等方式来实现。更多还原

【Abstract】 As an emerging business model, franchising has been playing a more and more important role in social activities. By the end of 2004, the total number of franchising systems in China has exceeded 2,000, which means that China has the largest number of franchising systems in the world. However, the cooperation between franchisors and franchisees is not that satisfactory. Franchisors’or (and) franchisees’rights are often infringed upon. Therefore, it is of great significance to study on the mutual governance mechanism in franchising and this paper will focus on this topic.Based on the summary of the existing academic achievements and analysis of their disadvantages, this paper puts forward two variables that franchisors and franchisees take into account when they are determining whether to join the franchising system. To be specific, on the basis of these two variables, franchisors will choose the ratio between company-owned units and franchised units, while franchisees will determine whether to join the franchising system or start up from the ground. In this way, a decision model on the two parties’decision making is build up.Based on the cases analysis in Chapter Four, this paper divides the opportunism in franchising relationship into two parts: one is ex ante adverse selection and the other is ex post moral hazard. For the former, this paper suggests regulating the franchisor’s qualification and relevant information disclosure; for the later, this paper suggests setting up“reputation incentive mechanism”and“discredit penalty mechanism”, or enhancing both parties’asset specialization.更多还原