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基于信息不对称的政府审计风险的控制研究
Government Audit Risks-Control in the Condition of Information Asymmetry
【作者】 王磊;
【导师】 干胜道;
【作者基本信息】 四川大学 , 工商管理, 2005, 硕士
【摘要】 信息经济时代,信息作为一种重要生产力资源影响着社会生活的方方面面。充分占有信息的优势方,在竞争日趋激烈的今天,往往能把握全局,规避风险,最终获得成功;而处于信息弱势的一方,在市场经济中举步为艰,随时面临着遭遇损失和失败的风险。因此,研究在信息不对称条件下,采用何种手段,运用何种方法将由于信息不对称带来的风险降到承受范围之内,对增强市场经济参与者把握全局和参与市场竞争的能力,有着重要而深远的意义。 政府审计作为受托经济的产物,代表政府行使监督审查职能,在保障社会主义市场经济健康有序地运行上发挥着越来越重要的作用。由于审计是受托经济的产物,所以审计与被审计之间天然存在着信息不对称,这种不对称直接影响审计监督的质量,引发审计风险。要树立政府审计的权威,做好社会主义市场经济的“守夜人”,政府审计必须研究和掌握信息不对称状况下,审计风险产生的机制,并有针对性地研究和制定缓解审计风险的方法、措施和手段。 本文试图在信息不对称的大前提下,结合作者在政府审计部门多年的工作经验,运用乔治·阿克洛夫和迈克尔·斯彭斯的信息不对称理论,分析阐述审计风险产生机制,并从实用的角度提出缓解审计风险的对策和建议。本文的第一部分首先介绍政府审计的基本概念;其次介绍政府审计风险的概念、特征和具体表现以及传统审计风险模型和现代审计风险模型的区别和影响;最后介绍目前审计风险的一些控制机制。第二部分首先介绍了“逆向选择”、“混同均衡”和“信号”等相关的信息不对称概念,再阐述了信息不对称条件下政府审计风险产生的机理。第三部分引入两个案例,详细的讲述信息不对称条件下的政府
【Abstract】 As an important productive resource, information is exerting great influence on the various aspects of the social life in the era of information economy. Nowadays, faced with keener and keener competition, the side that gets a full range of information will take the advantage to control the whole situation, avoid the risks and achieve the final success. On the contrary, the side that is in a disadvantageous position in getting information will be difficult in operation in the market economy and make itself faced with the risks of loss and defeat at any time. Hence, this study on how to reduce the risk brought about by the information asymmetry to the lowest level is of great and far-reaching significance to strengthen the ability of the participants of the market economy to take part in the competition of the market.As the product of the commissioned economy, the government audit is representing the government to perform the function of supervision and audit and playing a more and more important role in ensuring the healthy and orderly operation of the socialist market economy. In that audit is the product of the commissioned economy, there is naturally an asymmetry between the audit and the being audited. This asymmetry will affect the quality of audit and supervision and bring forth the audit risks. In order to build up the authority of the government auditand work as a qualified "night watchman" , the government audit must do a research and get a full knowledge of the mechanism of how the audit risks are produced in the condition of information asymmetry, and set down the ways and measures to reduce the audit risks.Based on the author’ s working experiences, this thesis tries to analyze how the audit risks take place with George A. Akerlof and AMichael Spence ’s theory on information asymmetry and put forward suggestions and measures on how to reduce the audit risks. The first Chapter tries to first introduce some basic definitions of government audit, and then introduce the definitions, characteristics and embodiment of the government audit risks, the differences between the traditional model of audit risks and the modern one and their respective influence. Finally it lists some control system of audit risks at the moment. The second Chapter introduces the definitions of "converse choice" , "mixed balance" and "signal" that are closely connected with information asymmetry, and the reason why the government audit risks come into being in the condition of information asymmetry. The third Chapter deals with two cases, which tells in detail how the government audit risks are produce in the condition of information asymmetry. The fourth Chapter gives some suggestions and measures on how to control the government audit risks on the basis of the analysis and cases mentioned in the previous chapters and the author’ s working experiences on audit.
- 【网络出版投稿人】 四川大学 【网络出版年期】2006年 06期
- 【分类号】F239.6
- 【被引频次】7
- 【下载频次】679