【作者】 林建国；

【导师】 张旭昆；

【作者基本信息】 浙江大学 ， 西方经济学， 2006， 硕士

【摘要】 公司控制权问题是公司发展中的决定性因素,也是现代公司治理结构的一个核心问题。我国上市公司的控制权转移已有二十多年的发展历史,每年都有市值三分之一上市公司进行了并购重组。我国的证券市场在其制度设计之初就奠定了其特殊性,与西方国家成熟资本市场的制度基础差别很大。股权分置和高度集中的特征决定了我国上市公司控制权转移主要是通过非流通股协议转让,与西方国家通过二级市场要约收购的方法差异很大。同时我国证券市场的有效性还存在争议,股价能否正确反映管理效率尚是一个问题。目前对我国控制权市场的研究尚很薄弱,面对汹涌的并购浪潮,借鉴吸收西方的公司控制权市场理论来研究我国特殊制度背景下的控制权市场极其必要。 本文对国内外的控制权市场的理论和实证研究进行了梳理,吸收了其中适合我国控制权市场的成果。在此基础上,对我国控制权市场的基本现状进行了分析,并进行国际间的比较。随后运用新制度经济学的制度演化理论对我国控制权市场的制度变迁过程进行了分析,得出我国控制权市场是政府倡导条件下由政府和民间合力推进的制度演化成果。本文并从我国证券市场股权分置的制度基础出发,建立数学模型对我国上市公司的控制权转移机制进行分析。分析结果表明控制权的转移将使新的控制者通过获取控制权收益来弥补成本,而不是着力提高企业效益,控制权市场趋向无效率。紧接着本文将事件研究法和会计研究法结合运用,对我国上市公司控制权市场的绩效进行实证研究。实证研究的结论表明我国上市公司控制权市场并没有使公司的业绩有显著提高,反而存在公司控制者通过内幕信息在二级市场上进行投机套利行为。理论与实证的研究均表明了我国上市公司控制权市场效率低下,这是由股权分置的股权结构这一制度基础问题所引起的。从这一角度审视我国控制权市场的发展,可以得出一些有益的改革思路。更多还原

【Abstract】 Corporate control is both the crucial factor of corporation development and a core issue of modern corporate governance structure. Takeover of listed corporations in China has developed for more than 20 years. Takeover happened to listed corporations about one third of the market capital value every year. As securities market of China has laid the foundation of its particularity since the institution had been designed, it is different greatly from the market foundation of Western countries. In contrast to the mode of tender offer in secondary market popular in Western Countries, the control is transferred mainly by the uncirculated stocks due to shares discretion and great centralization in China. As well, controversy surrounds the issue that whether securities market in China is effective or not. So, it is still a question whether the price of stocks can reflect the management efficiency. The research on the market for listed corporate control in China is very limited now. In face of the popularity of M&A, which is sweeping all over the world, it is necessary to draw upon the theories regarding corporate control market from Western countries to research the market with a special institution background in China.This thesis summarizes the theories and empirical studies on corporate control market and these results are adapted to research on China. Based on the literature review, this thesis analyzes the status quo of corporate control market in China and compares it with other international ones. Then this thesis uses New Institution Economics to analyze the institution change course of corporate control market in China. The conclusion is that corporate control market is the result advocated by government and caused by government together with civilian institution. Further, this thesis starts from the shares discretion, which is the institution foundation of corporate control market in China, and sets up mathematical model to analyze the control transfer mechanism of listed corporations in China. The analytic conclusion indicates that transfer of control will make the new holding companies to make up their costs through getting the private benefits of control rather than endeavor to improve corporation’s performance. So the corporate control market tends to be inefficient. This thesis employs event study and accountant study together to empirically study the performance of market for listed corporate control in China. The conclusion of the empirical study shows that the market for corporate control does not improve the target corporation’s performance. On the contrary, the holding company is generally to speculate and arbitrage by virtue of inside information in secondary market. The conclusions of theory and empirical study indicate that the market for corporate control in China is inefficient and this problem was caused by shares discretion mainly. As a result, according to the analyses from this perspective, some good approaches can be put forward.更多还原