【作者】 李刚；

【导师】 刘华；

【作者基本信息】 华中科技大学 ， 企业管理， 2005， 硕士

【摘要】 本学位论文简单的回顾了逃税理论在国内外的发展历程,并对国内外已有的研究成果进行简单的评价。结合我国目前的实际情况,运用现金比率法和法定税收潜力法分别对地下经济所导致的逃税规模和地上经济中的逃税规模进行了测算,并求出了总逃税额,为下文分析逃税对经济的影响作铺垫。在此基础上,分析了地上经济逃税额、地下经济逃税额和逃税总额对GDP、收入分配、资源配置和劳动力供给的影响,得出了目前我国地上经济逃税额和地下经济逃税额对经济的影响是不一致的结论,并简单的分析了其中的原因。通过建立一个比较静态博弈模型,并对模型求解,得出:纳税人的逃税额与惩罚力度、纳税人的贴现因子以及政府的监管概率成反比,与税率成正比; 而政府所需的税收监管力度与惩罚力度、纳税人贴现因子的平方以及政府的监管成本成反比,与税率的平方成正比; 最优税收监管并不是杜绝逃税的发生,对于追求眼前利益的纳税人,政府唯一可行的措施就是加强税收监管的时效性; 对于追求长远利益的纳税人,政府应该加大监管力度。以此作为理论基础,将企业分成了追求眼前利益的纳税人、追求长远利益的纳税人和遵守税法的纳税人三类,分别提出了提高监管的时效性、加大打击力度和完善与优化税制的政策建议。更多还原

【Abstract】 The paper will review the theory on tax evasion home and abroad briefly. Also, we shall evaluate recent results simply. According to the actual condition in China, this paper estimates the scale of tax evasion resulted from underground and overground economies respectively with the method of cash ratio method and taxation potential method. Since we have figured out overall amount of tax evasion, it is time for us to do further research into the relationship between tax evasion and economic growth. At the same time, the paper examines the effect of different type of tax evasion on GDP, income distribution and labor supply. After that, we arrive at the conclusion that overground tax evasion exerts a different influence on economics compared with underground tax evasion. We also analyze the reason of it. With a comparative static game model, we come to the conclusions as follows: The amount of tax evasion is negative to degree of punishment, discount factor and supervision probability of the government, while it is positive to tax rate. As for degree of taxation supervision, it is negative to degree of punishment, square of discount factor and cost of government supervision, while it is positive to square of tax rate. Optimal taxation supervision doesn’t mean stopping tax evasion from happening. Therefore, the only feasible measure for the government is to strengthen the timing of supervision for taxpayers with short-term interest. For taxpayers with long-term interest, it is necessary to strengthen the intensity of supervision. This paper divides enterprises into three categories, namely taxpayers with short-term interest, taxpayers with long-term interest and taxpayers who obey the tax law. We also put forward several suggestions, such as improving the timing of supervision, strengthening the degree of punishment, and perfecting the tax system.更多还原