【作者】 袁啸云；

【导师】 叶初升；

【作者基本信息】 武汉大学 ， 西方经济学， 2005， 硕士

【摘要】 风险投资由于其独特的作用日益受到各国政府的重视。风险投资的功能和作用集中体现在三个方面:一是有利于高新技术产业化,二是有利于推进企业创新,三是有利于推动金融技术创新和资本市场的完善。风险投资的出现,形成了各种关系,主要是:第一,风险投资者投资与风险资本家所创立和经营的风险组织,形成了第一层委托代理关系,由于信息不对称,风险投资者要承担巨大的风险;第二,风险资本家把风险资本投入风险企业,形成了第二层的委托代理关系,也由于信息不对称的问题,加上风险企业通常仅处于创业期、种子期和扩张期,其投资回报的预期具有的不确定性,风险资本家也要承受巨大的风险。基于这双重委托代理关系的出现,风险投资的契约问题成了研究的热点。研究文献从不同角度、用不同方法得到的成果琳琅满目,创新理论层出不穷,或者是对各种不同类型风险进行描述,或者提出各自不同的契约设计,或者是对现有各种机制进行比较,又或者通过历史数据进行经验性研究等等。总之,为了解决好这特殊的委托代理问题,在风险投资者、风险企业家和风险资本家这三方参与者之间要设计一套对代理人的激励和约束机制,最大化地降低其由于逆向选择和道德风险所带来的交易成本,使风险投资项目的顺利运行得到良好的保证。 文章从回顾过去的研究成果出发,把目光集中在风险投资的双重委托代理关系上,不同于以往仅仅把其中某一种关系作为研究对象的方法,运用标准的委托代理模型把这两层委托代理关系进行整合研究,得到一些新的结论。虽然这些结论只建立在严格的抽象和苛刻的假设上,也由于自身能力水平和客观条件的限制而没有进一步地进行数理检验,但论文的视角无疑是新颖的,可以很好地为对于风险投资的双重委托代理关系的深入研究所借鉴。虽然风险投资活动在我国出现较晚,但鉴于经济体制的特殊性,这一双重委托代理关系在实践中所带来的问题更多、所引致的成本更大,由于理论研究最终都应该服务于经济实践,这一课题对于我国理论界也是一个不小的挑战。更多还原

【Abstract】 Venture capital is propitious to the industrialization of new technology, the innovation of enterprise and the amelioration of capital market. There are two kinds of nexus lie in it: one is between venture capitalist and venture investor; the other is between venture capitalist and venture entrepreneur. When venture investors put money into the setup that has been created and working by venture capitalist, the first kind of "principal-agent" nexus appears. During the second stage, venture capitalist should be very cautious to choose a venture enterprise and invest in it, furthermore he care about or even join in the management of enterprise, then the other kind of "principal-agent" nexus comes into being. So there we have a "dual-principal-agent" problem in venture capital. Because badly asymmetry of information, it induces some disbarment results such as adverse selection and moral hazard. Many lectures studying the contract in venture capital separately talk about this two kind of nexus: some describe different types of venture; some suggest diversified contract design; some compare the mechanisms in existence; others are experiential research about historical data. In a word, to solve the special principal-agent problem, thinking of the three participants, we try to design a kind of effective mechanism, which can inspirit and restrict the agents. In this way, we can furthest reduce the transaction cost to assume the success of venture capital projects. This paper focus on this "dual-principal-agent" problem, integrate it into just one standard principal-agent model to get some new results. The visual angle of this paper is original and can be easily used for reference on study of the contract of venture capital, in despite of its conclusion comes from severe abstract and rigorous assumptions. Venture capital activities appear comparatively late in China, the "dual-principal-agent" nexus cause more cost and bring much more complex problems in practice because of the particularity of economy system. All these basic research should service the needs of expanding economy, so it may be a challenge to our academic research in China.更多还原