【作者】 张振勇；

【导师】 赵明清；

【作者基本信息】 山东科技大学 ， 运筹学与控制论， 2005， 硕士

【摘要】 独立审计与政府审计和内部审计的一个最大的不同之处就在于它是一种有偿服务,审计师及其事务所与其他企业一样也是理性的经济个体,需要依靠向社会提供产品或服务来取得收入、赚取利润。然而,审计产品的质量是不同于其他产品质量的,理论上它取决于审计师发现客户违约行为(会计报表错报或漏报)和披露该违约行为的联合概率,具有不可观察性的特点。由于现行实务中,审计师实际上是由企业管理当局聘用和付费的,审计质量的不可观察性决定了价格竞争不会带来审计质量的提升,激烈的价格竞争往往会诱使审计师不惜以降低审计收费、牺牲审计质量,甚至同管理当局合谋为代价承接业务,最终导致审计市场出现所谓劣币驱逐良币的现象,高质量的审计服务将会被驱逐出去。我国目前的证券审计市场上存在着激烈的竞争,部分事务所不惜以低价承接业务,严重损害了审计质量。研究审计定价行为,从理论上规范独立审计业务,并为监管部门的监管措施提供证据,已十分紧迫。 通过理论分析和实证检验,本文的结论是:审计定价对审计质量有着重大的意义,合理的审计业务定价是保证审计质量的前提。一般而言,审计定价中主要考虑因素是内部会计系统的规模以及社会公众因使用已审计财务报表可能遭受的预期损失。同时,外部法律环境以及审计师与客户对风险的偏好类型,将决定双方在审计定价中的地位,进而影响到议价能力。如果社会法律环境对审计客户要求承担更多的损失责任,而客户的风险回避倾向也越强,那么在两种财务信息质量控制方式上耗费的资源就越多。如果社会将更大的责任转嫁给审计师,若审计师是风险厌恶型的,他就会付出更多的审计资源以减少预期损失。除此之外,审计客户的股权结构、事务所的规模、审计师的定价策略以及是否提供非审计服务都会影响到审计业务定价过程中双方的议价能力。另外,针对我国审计市场的实证检验表明,我国证券市场上的审计定价基本上是以业务的工作量为基础的,但由于法律环境较为宽松并未充分考虑客户的经营风险;事务所还没有形成显著的级差效应,事务所规模并不会显著影响审计定价;此外,有较大比例国有股的上市公司往往在定价上具有较大的议价能力,并有压低审计费用的倾向。更多还原

【Abstract】 The greatest difference between independent audit and government audit is that the former is a kind of paid service. The auditors and his offices are rational economic individuals like other enterprises. They need to obtain revenues and profits by offering the products or the service to the society. But, the quality of audit is different from that of other products. Theoretically, it depends on the united probability of auditor finding customer’s noncompliance and revealing this noncompliance, which is characteristic with non-observing. In the current practice, auditors are employed and paid by the administrative authority of enterprises in fact. The character of non-observing determines that price competition cannot lead to audit quality’s promotion. Fierce price competition can lure auditor to accept business at the expense of lowering audit fees, sacrificing audit quality, and even colluding with manager authority. It will finally cause the phenomenon of bad money driving out good money, and the high-quality audit service will be expelled. Now, there is a furious competition in our country’ securities audit market. Some audit firms do not hesitate to accept the business at low price and injure audit quality seriously. It is urgent to study the pricing behavior of audit service so as to norm independent audit service and support supervision measure of the supervision department.Examine through theory analysis and empirical research, the conclusion of this paper is: The pricing behavior or audit service have great meaning to audit quality. Rational audit pricing is the prerequisite of guaranteeing to audit quality. Generally speaking, the main considerations include the scale of auditee’s inside accounting system and the anticipated loss that might suffer from public financial statements users. Meanwhile, the outside legal environment and the risk preference type of auditor and customer will determine the both sides’ status in audit pricing, and then influence the ability of pricing negotiation. In addition, auditee’s ownership structure, scale of the accounting firms, pricing tactics of auditor and non-auditing service are all influence the both sides’ ability of pricing negotiation during pricing. Besides that, empirical research indicates following result. First, the audit pricing on the security market of our country in the whole is based on the work that needed to accomplish audit service. But because the legal environment is comparatively too loose to fully consider the customer’s business risk. Accounting firms have not formed remarkable differential effect yet. Its scale does not influence audit pricing notably. Furthermore, the listed companies with larger proportion state-owned stock often have larger ability of pricing negotiation, and tend to force down audit fees.更多还原