【作者】 牛凤梅；

【导师】 于维生；

【作者基本信息】 吉林大学 ， 数量经济学， 2005， 硕士

【摘要】 本文运用委托代理模型中的基本思想,将委托代理模型运用于银行与企业间的金融契约中,将模型中的资本函数具体化,然后对存在逆向选择和道德风险两种情形下的模型进行求解,发现在以上两种信息不对称条件下,银行对企业的借贷资本量会发生扭曲。在委托代理模型与信用市场模型、Krugman 的道德风险模型的对比中我们发现,由于各个模型的侧重点不同,出发的角度不同,因而对于银行与企业间契约的分析会有不同的结果。通过对比,我们指出使用委托代理模型分析银行与企业间金融契约的优越性。为了克服信息不对称所带来的逆向选择和道德风险对均衡的影响,指出金融机构制定完善的激励约束机制的必要性,以及如何设计一套完善的激励约束机制以克服逆向选择和道德风险问题实行有效的资源配置。最后针对我国金融契约中存在的问题,指出构建和完善我国银行与企业间金融契约的几点建议。更多还原

【Abstract】 This article uses the basic thought of principal-agent model, applies principal-agent model to the financial contracts between the bank and the enterprise, specifies the capital function in the model, then to solve adverse selection and moral hazard model. We find that the bank will twist the loan capital amount of enterprise under the above two kinds of asymmetric information conditions. Via the contrast of principal-agent model, credit market model and moral hazard model of Krugman, we find that there are different results to the analysis of the contracts between the bank and the enterprise because the emphasis of each model are different, angles setting out are different. Through the contrast, we point out that using principal-agent model to analyze the financial contracts between the bank and the enterprise is superior. In order to overcome adverse selection and moral hazard what the asymmetric information brings to influence balance, we point out that the financial institutions should make perfect incentive constraint mechanisms, and how to design the perfect incentive constraint mechanisms for overcoming adverse selection and moral hazard problem to implement effective resource distribution. Finally, to the existing question of our country financial contracts, we point out some suggestions on structuring and perfecting our country financial contracts between the bank and the enterprise. Chapter one introduces the evolvement of the contract theory, the purpose of the description about the evolvement of the contract theory is to let us promote the understanding to the contract, then to introduce the financial contracts. Chapter two introduces principal-agent model and solves it. First, we introduce principal-agent model, client and agent have two asymmetry: the interests asymmetry and the information asymmetry, thus exist agent cost. Adverse selection and moral hazard which the asymmetric information brings cause the market to lack efficiency. Before solving the principal-agent model in the article, first, we do the specific introduction about the revelation principle, the revelation principle offers certain thought for solving the model, and simplifies the model. Using the revelation principle, we solve principal-agent model under asymmetric information, and provide the equilibrium under adverse selection and moral hazard separately. Among principal-agent model, when there is adverse selection situation, and under symmetrical information situation, k * < k*.The high-efficiency agent’s loan capital is more than the loan capital of the inefficient agent. Under the complete information, the client has no cost to implement agent, namely, the utility level which the client receives is equal to his carrying out this task in person; Under the asymmetric information condition, the repayment of the capital means secure interest rate, among (θ? v?θ/(1 ? v))αk SB (α?1 )=R,θαk *(α?1 )=R; θαk SB ( α?1 )= θαk*(α?1)=R, α∈(0,1). To high-efficiency enterprise, there is not distortion of the total amount of loan capital, k * =kSB; And to inefficient enterprise, the total amount of the loan capital is downward distortion, k SB< k*. Only high-efficiency enterprise gets one strictly positive information rent: U SB = ?θf(k)= ?θkα, α∈(0,1); U =0. When there is moral hazard situation, and under symmetrical information situation, t * = t*=t*, to the bank, its income is V1 = π1V+(1 ?π1)V?I, under the complete information, enterprise can raise the fund when I < I* =π1V+(1 ?π1)V. Credit side can benefit from this project incomedirectly, and the income of the project paid a part to the debit at this moment. Under asymmetric information situation, to the middle value of investment, I SB ≤I≤I*, if I > ISB, so V1 <0. Moral hazard means some projects can raise money under complete information situation, but can not raise money under incomplete information situation, namely, the loan that the bank gives to the debit will be downward distortion under asymmetric information. Chapter three introduces the contrast between other daily models and principal-agent model. Among credit market model, when there is adverse selection situation, money-lender improves interest rate to increase the possibility that borrowers do not refund; when there is moral hazard situation, money-lender improves interest rate to increase the possibility that borrowers invest the risky projects, all these exerts an influence on the creditor’s prospective earnings, credit ration is produced. Credit market model neglects that money-lender offers two contracts and borrowers indicate own type situation because of choosing different contracts, neglects the possibility of different equilibriums in this case, make the money-lender offer the same terms of loan contracts to all borrowers. Money-lender improves interest rate to make the borrowers of G type borrow money unwillingly, and make the borrowers of B type borrow money willingly still, borrowers have motives to invest the risky investment projects, make money-lender’s loan augment the investment risk, so bring the badness loan, and cause financial risk. Among the moral hazard model of Krugman, under the investment distortion situation, the stock of the capital is K = ( A?R+μ1 p1+μ2p2)/2B, when the financial intermediary institution has the incline of moral hazard, the stock of the capital is K ′=( A?R+μ2)/2B. Under the moral hazard situation, it will cause over-investment. It is not subdivide the efficiency of enterprises in更多还原