【作者】 徐玲；

【导师】 魏成龙；

【作者基本信息】 河南大学 ， 国民经济学， 2005， 硕士

【摘要】 对于中国目前的农村土地政策,现有研究存在诸多问题,这主要体现在两个方面:一个是对现有农村土地利用中存在的系列现象的解释缺乏深度,另一个是对现有农村土地政策的分析、评价以及相关的政策建议方面缺乏严密的论证和科学性。所以,本文试图对这一系列现象中的几个重要现象进行一下重新解释,并对现行的农村土地政策进行了较深入的分析,并在此基础上给出了自己的见解和政策建议。 第一章为导论,第二章对新中国的农村土地政策进行了一个简要的回顾。 第三章主要对目前农村中存在的耕地“抛荒”现象进了解释,本文却认为,土地抛荒与目前的家庭联产承包责任制并没有必然的联系,耕地作为一种最基本的农业生产要素,之所以出现闲置,就在于其赢利过低,从而激励农民将劳动力资源配置到其他领域,导致劳动力与土地的分离,从而出现土地“抛荒”现象。 第四章对目前中国农村的土地流转问题进行了分析。在从经济史的角度对中国农村的土地流转进行了简要的回顾之后,我们分析了目前中国农村土地流转市场不发达的深层次原因,并对现有众多研究所谓的“要培育土地流转市场”的观点给予了讨论,本文认为:目前,中国农村土地的大规模流转还不具备条件,还不可能在短期内形成一个高度流动性的土地市场;而且,本文还认为,“土地流转”市场不是政府所能够“培育”出来的,而是内生出来的,外生地强制推行所谓的“加速土地流转”必将出现“南辕北辙”。 第五章则是本文的核心之一,针对目前中国农村实行的“30 年不变”土地政策进行了一个经济分析,探讨了这一政策下农民对土地进行长期投资的激励与约束,并且分析了不同的土地调整政策对农民长期投资的不同激励。 第六章为全文的总结,基于目前中国农村的现状,对中国农村未来的土地政策进行了一下展望,并提出了自己的观点。 II本文的主要结论为:第一、土地抛荒现象的存在与现行的家庭联产承包责任制并没有必然的联系。某些地区的农民之所以抛荒土地,原因在于农业的成本高收入低,相对于其他产业的比较利益降低,所以,他们宁愿将外出打工或者以其他形式出卖自己的劳动力而获得更高的收入,从而导致农业劳动力与土地的分离。所以,解决土地抛荒的根本途径在于政府要加大对农业的补贴和支持力度,增加农业的收益,激励农民耕种土地的积极性;第二、目前中国农村的土地流转市场不发达是有其本身的原因的,现有研究所声称的土地制度阻碍了农村土地流转市场的发育并不一定成立。土地流转市场不发达在于目前中国还不存在土地流转市场的“买方”。而且,中国目前的经济状况下,加上农业耕种的特殊性和中国的传统文化的影响,也不太可能出现大规模的土地流转市场。最后,我们还认为现有理论以及政策制定者所谓的要“培育”土地流转市场也是值得再考虑的,因为土地流转市场是内生与经济发展过程中的,期望外生的“培育”只能是拔苗助长或缘木求鱼。第三、现有理论研究所认为的目前中国的农村土地制度削弱了农民进行长期投资的激励也是值得再探讨的。本文的理论分析表明:首先,尽管中央规定了“30 年不变”的土地政策,但是很多地区的农民还是进行了频繁的土地调整,这一点充分说明了目前土地对于农民的社会保障功能。所以,要不要调整实际上是一个公平与效率的抉择;其次,在存在级差地租的情况下,小调整其实根本不会影响农户的投资行为,更谈不上削弱农户的长期投资激励;第三,大调整也只会影响到某些少数类型的长期投资行为,而这些类型的长期投资的主要部分其实具有“公共品”的特征,农户缺乏投资的积极性是一种必然,也土地政策也没有必然的联系;第四,家庭联产承包责任制下土地经营的零碎化和规模偏小,从而导致无法实现规模经济,这是事实,但是这未必能构成否决家庭联产承包责任制的理由,这种状况也是由中国目前人多地少的现状决定的。即使废除了家庭联产承包责任制,也未必就能够出现规模经营。而土地零碎化和更多还原

【Abstract】 As for as the research of the Land Policy in Rural China, there are a lot of problems. One is that the explanations to the phenomenon of land utilities in rural china are not so deep. Another is that the analysis ,the commendation and the correlated policy suggestion to the present land policy lack accurate demonstration and scientificity. Thus, the paper will try to renewedly explain some important aspects of the series phenomenon and do deep research to the present land policy and on this base I will give my own opinions and policy suggestions. Chapter one is the preface. Chapter two is the concise review to the land policy of new China. Explaining the phenomenon of the idle land in rural China is the main content of chapter three. This paper will demonstrate that there is not inevitable correlation between idle land and household responsibility system. The reason that the land as the basic production element is idle is that the profit is too low so the peasants transfer their labor force to other areas. The result is that the labor force detaches from the land and the land is idle. In chapter four I will analysis the land circulation. I will analysis the deep reason of the undeveloped land market in rural China after the concise review of the land circulation from the point of economic history. And then I will discuss the so-called opinion of cultivating the land market. This paper demonstrates that the condition for developing large-scale land market is not enough and the market of high liquidity can’t come into being in short time. This paper also suggests that the government can’t cultivate the land market and it can only grow from itself. The behaviors that execute forcibly the so-called policy of quickening the land circulation will only run in the opposite. Wile chapter five is one of core of this paper. This chapter is an economic analysis of the Land Rights Fixed for 30 Years in rural China. In this part I will discuss the stimulation and the restriction of long-term investment and analysis that different land regulation will result in different stimulation to the long-term investment. Chapter six is the conclusion and also an expectation to the future land policy of rural China on the base of present conditions. Last I would propose my own opinions. The main conclusions of this paper are the bellows: Firstly, there are no inevitable correlation between present Household Responsibility System and the Idle Land. The reason that there are idle lands in some areas of rural China is that the cost of agriculture is too high and the profit is too low. The peasants would rather go out and sale their own labor force in other forms for higher income. Thus the labor force and the land divorce. So the fundamental way that we solve the problem of Idle Land is that the government should increase the allowance and support to agriculture in order to increase the profit and cultivate the peasant’s initiative of farming. Secondly, there is inheriting reason that the land market is undeveloped. The existing research demonstrates that the land system hold the development of land market don’t necessarily come into existence. The reason that the land market is undeveloped is that now China doesn’t exist the buyer of land market. Moreover, because of the present economic condition, specialization of agriculture and the effect of Chinese traditional culture the possibility of appearing larger scale land market is small. Last, we also believe that we should consider more about the present theory---the so-called cultivating land market because the land market can only grow from the discourse of economy development. The expectation of cultivating it from outside can only spoil things by excessive enthusiasm or try to do the impossible. Thirdly, the present point that the existing land system weakens the enthusiasmof the peasant for long-term investment should also be considered again. The theory analysis of the paper demonstrates: Fist, though the central set the policy of land rights fixed for 30 years, the更多还原