【作者】 王雪莲；

【导师】 刘兵；

【作者基本信息】 河北工业大学 ， 企业管理， 2005， 硕士

【摘要】 建立并完善企业经营者激励与约束机制,是保证企业经营者才能正常、充分发挥的重要条件,也是促进我国国有企业改革与发展的一项重要措施。本文着重对企业经营者的动态激励与监督问题进行了研究。 首先,在对企业经营者动态激励问题的研究中,本文引入柯布——道格拉斯生产函数,将经营者的努力分为报酬性努力和非报酬激励性努力两种努力水平,重新建立了经营者的动态激励棘轮效应模型;并基于系统论的观点,建立了考虑第1期产出对第2期产出的影响的弱化棘轮效应模型。企业所有者为了更加清楚地掌握企业的经营状况与经营者的工作努力水平,可以通过引入监督者来减少企业所有者与经营者之间的信息不对称程度,但同时要防止监督者与经营者合谋或监督者滥用职权,本文在Vafai模型的基础上,建立了企业经营者的监督模型,证明了经营者的努力水平和享受闲暇因素会影响契约的结果。企业经营者的监督约束机制是保证企业有效运行、经营者才能正常发挥的一个重要条件。针对目前对企业经营者管理腐败行为的各种监督机制缺乏定量研究的情况,本文运用博弈论中的监督博弈模型确定了单个监督机制实施的最优监督力度,然后根据实施各种监督机制的控制主体(政府)所追求目标的不同,提出了成本——收益法和均值——方差法两种确定多种监督机制最优实施比例的方法。这两种方法为定量研究各种经营者监督机制的实施问题,提供了有益的理论参考。最后,本文提出了完善有利于企业经营者激励与监督机制有效运行的各种宏、微观环境条件建设的建议。更多还原

【Abstract】 Establishing and perfecting the incentive and restrict mechanism of the enterprise’s managers is an important condition that ensures the managers’ abilities exert normally. And that is also a vital measure to improve the state-owned enterprises’ reform of our country. The thesis mainly studies the dynamic and supervision problem of the enterprise’s managers.First, in the study of the dynamic incentive on the enterprise’s managers, this thesis reestablishes the ratchet effects model by introducing Cobb-Douglas production function into it and categorizing the managers’ efforts as reward effort and non-reward incentive effort. And based on the system theory’s view, this paper establishes the alleviating ratchet effects model that considers the influence of the first time’s output on the second time. In order to hold more information of the enterprise’s operation and the manager’s effort level, the enterprise’s owner can introduce a supervisor to decrease the information’s asymmetry degree between them. However, the owner also needs to prevent the supervisor colluding with the manager and the supervisor abusing his authority. Based on the Vafai model, the paper establishes the manager’s supervision model, and proves that the agent’s effort level and leisure-enjoying factor will change the contracts’ results. Supervision and constraint mechanism on enterprise’s managers is an important condition which ensures that the enterprise can operate effectively and the managers can exert their abilities normally. But there is little research on how to use a variety of supervision mechanisms on the managers’ management corruption behaviors. This thesis studies the optimal supervision level of one single mechanism based on the supervision game model in the game theory. And according to the different goals that the controller (government) of each supervision mechanism’s operation pursues, this paper puts forward the cost-income approach and the mean-deviation approach to determine each mechanism’s optimal proportion of combined supervision mechanisms. The two approaches offer good theory reference to study the enterprise’s managers’ supervision problem quantitatively. Finally the paper puts forward some advice on perfecting the kinds of conditions to ensure the managers’ incentive and supervision mechanism operate effectively.更多还原