【作者】 李燃；

【导师】 朱卫东；

【作者基本信息】 合肥工业大学 ， 企业管理， 2005， 硕士

【摘要】 国有企业改革中,国有资产流失,代理人道德风险现象仍然存在。从理论上说,就是出资者财务监督软约束。这个问题解决不好,国企改革就会难以彻底。本文旨在强化作为出资人的国资委对国有独资公司的财务监督,从而实现国有资本保值增值。因此本文的主要论述内容如下: 首先,探讨财务监督的一般原理。分析了财务监督的内涵,以及辩明财务监督与会计监督的关系。 其次,探究了国资委对国有独资公司财务监督的内涵。从监督的主体、内容、原则、对象与目标方面进行了阐述。 然后,通过Google网站数据库进行检索,得出一些结论。国资委对国有独资公司财务监督失效的表现有,一是内部人控制及代理人的道德风险;二是费用支出增加和投资失控;三是是财务权力分散和财务信息失真。国资委对国有独资公司财务监督失效的原因有,一是国有独资公司治理问题;二是财务监督机制不合理;三是国资委目前机关式的工作架构的问题:四是国资委行使出资人财务监督职能弱化:五是国有独资公司股东的代理性问题。 最后,针对问题,提出了对策。一是完善国有独资公司的治理机制。二是加强外派监事会对国有独资公司的财务监督。财务总监应由监事会考核选派,选派的财务总监对监事会负责。三是加强国资委从资本、预算、组织、人员、制度控制方面对国有独资公司实施财务监督。财务监督管理过程划分为四个不同层面上的财务主体或财务管理机构:国资委“董事会”——国资委“财务委员会”——国有独资公司董事会——国有独资公司审计委员会。四是加强国资委对国有独资公司的网络财务监督。首先,国资委建立对国有独资公司财务监督的信息反映制度;其次构建国资委对国有独资公司财务监督的信息网络中心,在这一部分论述了构建财务监督信息网络中心的作用和意义,提出构建财务监督信息网络中心的思想模型,设计出国资委对国有独资公司财务监督网络系统构架和国资委对国有独资公司财务监督网络系统流程。更多还原

【Abstract】 During the reforms of State-owned enterprises, the loss of state assets and the phenomena of agent moral hazard still survive. Theoretically, it means the investor’s financial supervision is lack of effective constraint. If this problem can’t be solved, the reforms of state-owned enterprises can’t go well. This dissertation aims at intensifying the financial supervision which SASAC as the investor to the Solely State-owned Company in order to maintain and increase the state-owned property. The detailed research contains:First, discusses the general laws of financial supervision. Analyzes the meaning of financial supervision and distinguishes the financial supervision with accounting supervision.Secondly, researches the meaning of financial supervision which SASAC as the investor gives to the Solely State-owned Company. Explores the main body, content, principle, object and target of the supervision.Then, reaches some conclusions by searching goolge’s network database. The invalidation of financial supervision which SASAC as the investor to the Solely State-owned Company mainly find expression in: first, the insider control and agent moral hazard; secondly, the augment of expenditures and the uncontrolled investment, thirdly, the decentralization of financial authority and the distortion of financial information. The reasons for invalidation of financial supervision that SASAC gives to the Solely State-owned Company as follows: corporate governance of the Solely State-owned Company, secondly, the financial supervision system is unreasonable, thirdly, the present administrative construct of SASAC, fourthly, SASAC’s function of supervision is weakening. Fifthly, shareholder’s agency in the Solely State-owned Company.At last, aims at the above problems, then, puts forward the countermeasures. First, improves the Solely State-owned Company’s governance mechanism. Secondly, strengthens the financial supervision which exterior board of supervisors gives to the Solely State-owned Company. The board of supervisors should assess and designs the CFO who should be responsible for the board of supervisors. Thirdly, the SASAC should strengthen the financial supervision to the Solely State-owned Company from the aspects of capital, budget, organizing, personneland system. The administrative procedure of financial supervision can be dividedinto four subjects of financial on different levels; directorate of SASAC------financial committee of SASAC------directorate of the Solely State-owned Company------auditing committee of Solely State-owned Company. Fourthly, strengthens theInternet financial supervision to the Solely State-owned Company. At first, SASAC should constitute the information feedback system that aims at the Solely State-owned Company; next, constitutes the information center of financial supervision which SASAC gives to the Solely State-owned Company. In this part, discusses the action and meaning of constituting the information center, brings forward the mental models which constitute the center, designs the framework and system flow of financial supervision’s circuital system.更多还原