【作者】 兰靖；

【导师】 陈君宁； 常亚平；

【作者基本信息】 华中科技大学 ， 企业管理， 2004， 硕士

【摘要】 融资次序是指企业在作融资决策时对不同融资方式进行选择的先后次序,它是与融资偏好紧密关联的研究范畴。融资次序研究是由资本结构研究衍生而来。Donalson(1961)[1]首先观察到了企业可能遵循首先内部融资、其次是债务、再次才是发行股票的次序进行融资,这引发了大量学者对融资次序研究的兴趣。Myers和Majluf(1984)[2]及其他学者的后续研究通过放松传统资本结构理论(MM理论)的信息充分完全这一假设,引入信息不对称观点,借助信号传递假说对上述融资次序的产生原因进行解释,形成了优序融资理论(Pecking Order)。该理论认为:(1)企业的外部投资者、债权人和企业经理对信息的掌握呈典型的不对称分布,企业经理在与外部投资者和债权人的博弈中占据优势地位;(2)由于企业提高债务比例则意味着经理预期企业将有更好的经营业绩,考虑到破产对企业经理的巨大惩罚约束,因此债务融资比例成为投资者判断企业预期市场价值高低可靠的信息传递工具,起到象信号指示的作用;(3)在企业作融资决策时必须考虑到信号指标所蕴涵的信息可能对投资者造成的不同影响,并权衡资金成本等其他因素的影响最终形成了先内源融资再外源融资、先债权融资后股权融资的最佳融资次序。本文为验证我国上市公司的融资行为是否遵循上述优序融资理论,对我国上市公司实际融资状况进行实证描述,其结果表明我国上市公司的确存在着一定的股权融资偏好,其融资行为亦不遵循优序融资理论,存在股权融资时其资本融资次序为先股权融资、再内源融资、最后才是长期债权融资;不存在股权融资时,资本融资次序为先内源融资再长期债权融资。造成上市公司存在一定股权融资偏好的主要原因在于(1)资本市场建设初期国家、上市公司与公众投资者之间畸形的信号显示与博弈;(2)企业债券市场发展的严重滞后;(3)上市公司本身的治理结构问题重重。因此,欲使上市公司按照正确的融资次序融资进而达到资本结构优化和企业价值最大<WP=5>化的目标,就必须在资本市场上形成良好互动的信息显示与博弈、大力发展完善我国企业债券市场、优化上市公司本身的治理结构。鉴于本文实证描述的行业局限性,未来的研究可以针对我国上市公司不同行业分别就影响我国上市公司融资次序的各种因素进行实证测定。更多还原

【Abstract】 Financing order is the order of the selection of different financing ways when a corporation is making financing decisions, it has consanguineous relationship with financing preference. Research of financing order develops from theories of capital structure. Donalson(1961)[1] first observed that enterprise may obey the rule of firstly inner financing、secondly debt and lastly stock in financing, which interests many other researchers. Through releasing perfect information hypothesis of MM theory, Myers and Majulf(1984)[2] and subsequent research introduce asymmetric information ideas, use signaling hypothesis to explain this phenomenon, finally bring out the theory of pecking order. This theory shows: (1)information distribution among outer investors、loaners and managers takes on typical asymmetry, managers have the overwhelming advantages in the game; (2)managers would expect better achievement when they raise the debt leverage, taken the string of bankruptcy into account, the debt leverage would be a reliable signaling instrument which helps investors to estimate the market value of the enterprise;(3)when enterprise make the financing decisions, they must think it over what impact different financing decisions would lead to, balancing with the cost of capital and other factors, enterprise would finally choose pecking order in financing.In order to validate whether Chinese listed companies obey the pecking order in financing, this paper makes an empirical description, the result show Chinese listed companies have strong preference in stock financing, they do not obey the pecking order in financing, their financing order is firstly inner financing、secondly stock financing、lastly debt financing. The main reason for listed companies’ stock financing preference lies in (1)during the capital markets construction, government、listed companies and outer investors play a freakish information game; (2)the development of the market of enterprise bonds was severely lagged;(3) there exists many govern problem in listed companies. So, to make listed companies obey the pecking order or more to achieve the goal of capital structure optimization and enterprise’s value maximization, it is bad needed that healthy <WP=7>information game was played、strengthen the development of the market of enterprise bonds、optimization the corporation government structure. Thinking about the limit of this paper, future research may give the empirical research on the impact factors of financing order distinguishing different industry.更多还原