【作者】 苗秀花；

【导师】 杨明；

【作者基本信息】 华中科技大学 ， 概率论与数理统计， 2004， 硕士

【摘要】 研究与开发(R&D)是企业经营与管理的一个重要内容,也是政府部门所期望的行为。在R&D决策过程中,现在普遍采用的是净现金流(Net Cash Flow,简写为NCF)方法,亦称为净现值方法。R&D从最初的研究到最终产品市场化要经过较长的阶段,并且有许多不确定因素,即风险。但是风险与收益并存。决策者为了鼓励企业进行研发活动,应该恰当地设计合同,以带来最大的社会福利。本文研究了R&D合同的拍卖,目的是为委托人带来最大的收益,并给出在该合同下,代理人的决策过程和决策结果。在一阶段拍卖中,投标人只是就所得收益的份额进行投标,中标之后代理人进行研发活动,并提供相应的努力,研发后的结果是跟研发规模和努力水平紧密相连的。本文的研究表明激励合同在R&D情形下未必最优。在两阶段拍卖中研究的是采购合同。投标人的生产包括两个阶段,首先是研发,但没有产品产出,而是获得下阶段生产的单位成本,其次是项目完成阶段。考虑了在不同的R&D技术框架下完全信息解的实施。投标人在获得合同后的收益和获得合同的概率之间进行权衡。委托人设计恰当的拍卖机制,来达到她的目标。在协作研发合同中,本文给出了渗透系数对完全信息解的对称性和大小的影响。文章指出,当失败率是研发规模的严格减函数并且渗透系数充分接近1或者失败率是严格减函数并且渗透系数充分接近0时,完全信息解是不对称的。更多还原

【Abstract】 R&D is not only an important aspect of firm’s running and management, but also what the government agency expects. In the decision process of R&D, Net Cash Flow method is adopted widely. It will takes a long time from original research to finally being put on market, and always companied with lots of uncertain factors, i.e. risk. But profit exists paralleling risk. The decision-maker should design pretty contract in order to encourage firms to carry on R&D, and so the decision-maker itself will gain maximal social welfare.This paper considers auction of this kind of R&D contract, aims that bring the principal maximal profit. And it also gives the agent’s decision process and decision result. In one-stage auction, the bidders bid for the sharing rate of profits, if he gains the conract, the agent will carry through R&D, exerts effort . The result of R&D is closely connected with effort level and the scale. It will points out that incentive contract is not desirabe under plausible conditions in R&D contracing.Procurement contract is studied in two-stage auction. The production process consists of two stages. In the first stage, the firms invests in R&D with the outcome of knowledge about the cost. In the second stage, production is carried out and additional effort can be exerted to further reduce costs. It also studies the implementing of the full-information solution. The bidders will trade-off between the profits and winning probability. The principal will design proper auction mechanism to achieve her goal.In the cooperative R&D contract, this paper shows the effects of pervasion parametre on the symmetry and size of the full-information solution. The paper also points out that when the failure rate is strictly decreasing in and is close to 1 or the failure rate is strictly increasing and is close to 0, the full-information solution is anisomerous.更多还原