【作者】 印猛；

【导师】 秦永和；

【作者基本信息】 武汉大学 ， 会计学， 2004， 硕士

【摘要】 公司治理就是选择恰当契约安排来实现剩余索取权与控制权的对应，以确保企业的决策效率。而上市公司的本质特征就是所有权与经营权相分离，这种所有权和经营权的分离就必然会产生委托——代理关系，上市公司的所有者将其在企业产权中的经营权委托给经营者代理行使。由于委托人与代理人之间的信息不对称，契约不完备，代理人与委托人的效用函数不一致，代理人的行动不能直接被委托人观察到，从而产生代理人不以委托人利益最大化为目标的道德风险和逆向选择。正如代理理论所分析的那样，上市公司的管理者也是经济人，他们同样以自身利益最大化为目标，当这种目标与所有者的利益相冲突时，牺牲股东的利益对于他们来说显然是一个合理的选择。代理问题、信息不对称与不完全契约的同时存在使公司治理成为必要，保护投资者利益成为了上市公司治理的核心内容。 而我国上市公司股权结构不合理，国家股所占比重过大，“一股独大”。股权结构是公司治理结构的基础，它对于公司治理结构的控制权方式、运作方式乃至效率等都有重要影响。国有股“一股独大”使国有股股东行为发生了严重的扭曲，国家所有权的代理行使问题至今没有得到妥善的解决，“所有者缺位”现象比较普遍。国有股“一股独大”的畸形股权结构必然造成公司治理结构内部权力配置功能的扭曲和制衡机制的无效。“一股独大”和“所有者缺位”又导致了严重的“内部人控制”，危及包括股东在内的利益相关者的利益。因此引进机构投资者参与我国上市公司治理，是解决“一股独大”、“所有者缺位”和“内部人控制”一个有效的途径。 本文从我国上市公司治理的现状出发，分析了我国上市公司治理存在的问题，提出引进机构投资者参与我国上市公司治理；并分析了机构投资者的种类、特征和作用以及机构投资者参与公司治理的国际趋势和我国机构投资者参与上市公司治理的实例；探讨了目前机构投资者参与我国上市公司治理的制度障碍及其对策。更多还原

【Abstract】 Corporate governance is to choose proper contract arrangement to insure that claim to firm’s residue is in proportion to rights of control. Ownership rights separating from operating rights is the intrinsically characteristic in listed companies, and this separation will consequentially lead to Principle-Agent problem, so owners of listed companies give their operating rights to the agent to running the companies. Unsymmetrical information, incomplete contracts, and the agent’s activities being not seen directly will lead to the agents’ moral risk and adversary choice, and the utility function between principle and agent is different. Just as the analysis of agent theory, managers of listed companies are economic man; they will pursuit the objective of their benefit maximizing. When this objective is different from the owners’ objective, sacrificing the owners’ benefit is a good selection to them. Corporate governance is necessary duo to agent problems, unsymmetrical information, incomplete contracts, and guaranteeing the investors’ benefit comes to be the main problem in listed companies.But ownership structure in Chinese listed companies is illogical; state shares have a great proportion. Ownership structure is the base of corporation governance. It has a great effect on ways of control and operation as well as efficiency of corporate governance structure. State shares having a great proportion will distort the activities of stockholders of state shares, and the agent problem of state ownership has not been well solved, and the phenomena "owners are not in the place" is normal. The illogical state shares structure will consequentially lead to improper rights arrangement and invalid balance mechanism on governance structure in listed companies. 揟he owner is not in its place" lead to serious insiders’ control, which will do harm to stockholders and other relative people. So bringing the institutional investors to corporate governance is a good way to solve the problems of "insiders’ control".This paper begins from the status in quo of corporate governance in Chinese listed companies, analyses the problems of corporate governance in Chinese listed companies, puts forward bringing institutional investors to corporate governance, analyses the kinds, characteristic and functions of institutional investors as well as the international trend of functions of institution investors in corporate governance in companies and the case in listed companies in China. We also discuss the system obstacle and countermeasure of institutional investors participating in the corporate governance in listed companies.更多还原