【作者】 林浣；

【导师】 钱雪亚；

【作者基本信息】 浙江大学 ， 政治经济学， 2003， 硕士

【摘要】 在世界上大多数国家中，集中的股权结构已成为一种普遍现象，而随之产生的控股股东侵害中小股东行为也成为各国公司治理的焦点。在我国上市公司中，控股股东对中小股东的侵害十分普遍，并日益受到广泛关注。目前，国内学术界对这一侵害现象比较普遍的看法是：以国有股为特征的控股股东的存在(即国有股的“一股独大”)直接导致了控股股东对中小股东的侵害。 本文选用控制权私人收益来衡量控股股东对中小股东的侵害程度，通过控制权私人收益与股权结构关系的实证研究，剖析了我国上市公司控股股东的侵害度，并进一步探讨了“一股独大”对控股股东侵害行为的影响。论文依据我国证券市场2001—2002年间91个上市公司控制权转移的样本，对上市公司的控制权私人收益水平进行了估计，并进一步实证了股权结构与控制权私人收益之间的关系，最后分析了投资者保护程度对控制权私人收益水平的影响。研究结果表明：(1) 我国上市公司的控制权私人收益要高于世界平均水平；(2) 控制权私人收益与第一大股东持股比例显著负相关，与国有股比例不存在显著相关性；(3) 投资者保护程度与控制权私人收益水平成反比。 由此本文认为，国有股的“一股独大”虽然不利于公司治理，但并非控股股东侵害问题严重的恶源，投资者保护的不健全才是问题症结所在。股权分散并不必然使控股股东的侵害行为受到足够的约束，不能将目前上市公司出现的十分严重的控股股东侵害行为简单的归因于一股独大。实证结果还表明，随着控股股东持股比例的上升，中小股东受侵害程度反而是下降的。因而，限制控股股东侵害行为的根本解决方法在于健全法律制度对股东的保护，在相关法律环境能制约控股股东行为的前提下，控股股东治理仍然是有效率的。更多还原

【Abstract】 In most countries in the world, a phenomenon that controlling shareholders expropriate corporate assets is very popular. In fact, the expropriation is more popular in China. Many people think it should be associated with ownership structure. Building on the empirical research of private benefits of control and ownership structure, this paper analyzes the expropriation of controlling shareholders in listed Chinese companies. This paper estimates the private benefits of control of listed companies based on 91 samples of control transactions between 2001 and 2002,and investigates the effects of ownership structure on private benefits of control. Then give a theoretic analysis about protecting of investors and private benefits of control.This paper find out following results: (1) the average of private benefits of control in China is more than that around the world;(2) Private benefits of control has negative correlation with the shares of the controlling shareholders and has no significant correlation with the state-owned shares;(3) Poor legal rules protecting public investors is associated with higher private benefits of control.This paper suggests that the real reason for the expropriation is poor protecting for investor rather than ownership concentration. Ownership concentration does not necessarily lead to less expropriation. In the case of good legal environments, the controlling shareholders could have an efficient effect on corporate governance.更多还原