基于EVA的经营者业绩评价与激励机制探讨

【作者】 宋雅琴；

【导师】 张明燕；

【作者基本信息】 南京理工大学 ， 会计学， 2003， 硕士

【摘要】 20世纪90年代以来，财务管理的目标演进为股东价值最大化，但委托——代理理论告诉我们，在企业经营权与所有权分离的条件下，经营者不可能像股东一样思维或行动。如何选用合适的经营者业绩评价指标，建立科学的激励机制，把对经营者的激励与其真实的经营业绩挂钩，有效地激励和约束经营者，缓解经营者与股东之间的矛盾，成为一个难题。 文章首先将EVA指标与传统的经营者业绩评价指标进行比较，论证EVA是一个相对合理的经营者业绩评价指标。随后，文章将EVA指标融入传统的年薪制与股票期权制中，试图探求更新的、更有效的激励机制。最后，文章认为，基于EVA的经营者业绩评价与激励机制在我国的广泛应用和有效地发挥作用，需要市场经济的进一步完善和企业体制改革的进一步深化。更多还原

【Abstract】 Since 1990s’, the objective of financial management has developed and become stockholder-valve-maximization. But principle-agent theory tells us that managers will never contemplate or act in the way that stockholders do so long as the management and ownership of enterprises are separated. How to select a proper managers’ performance measurement indicator and set up the incentive mechanism, so as to link up the incentive for managers with their performance, stimulate and restraint managers effectively, and reduce the conflicts between managers and stockholders, becomes a difficult problem.Firstly, this thesis makes a comparison between EVA and traditional managers’ performance measurement indicators, and demonstrate that EVA is a relatively rational indicator. And then, this thesis combines EVA with traditional annual salary system and stock option system, and tries to search for a newer and more effective incentive mechanism. Finally, this thesis holds that only if China continues to perfect market economy and deepen enterprises’ structural reform, can EVA based managers’ performance measurement and incentive mechanism be extensively applied and can we get the utmost of them.更多还原