【作者】 周县华；

【导师】 吕长江；

【作者基本信息】 吉林大学 ， 会计学， 2004， 硕士

【摘要】 在英国和美国的公司中，股权结构比较分散，每个单独的股东都很少有足够的动因来监督管理当局，同时他们的监督能力也非常有限。这样导致的结果是公司控制中的绝大部分冲突来自于公司内部管理者与外部股东之间的矛盾。在这些公司中，股利支付被看成是减少经理们可控现金流数量的一种手段（Jensen,1986; Lang和Litzenberger,1989）。在其他更多的国家里，公司治理的作用又有些不同，在日本和大多数的东南亚国家里，金字塔式和交叉控制模式普遍存在。在这些国家里，法律对于公司管理的要求是相对薄弱的(Claessens et al,2000)。在欧洲大陆，高度集中的股权结构是显著的特征，当然公司法所扮演角色的重要性也是相对较弱的。在欧洲大陆的公司里，大股东有着足够的动机和充分的能力来控制公司，因此在英美公司中典型的经理——股东之间的矛盾在这里并不是最主要的矛盾。在这些公司里，大股东要把公司这块蛋糕做大，但是大股东由于控制权增大所带来的利益却并没有被小股东们所享有，从而产生了大股东与小股东之间的冲突。（Boehmer ，1998）。在中国，上市公司的最大股东或者有控制权的股东往往都是国家或者法人。他们所持有的股票与小股东手中的股票权利是一样的，但是由于他们手中的股票不能流通，所以其股票的价值要低于可以流通的股票。这种“同股同权但是不同价”现象会把控制股东与小股东的利益分开。控制股东们手中股票的“不能交易性”导致了这些“惰性股票”的价格较低，因此当发放股利时，控制股东的报酬率就会高于小股东的报酬率。考虑到这一点，控制股东在公司首次发行股票的过程中，并不会因为他们所购得的股票缺乏流动性而不高兴，相反，他们可能更愿意在合适的价格水平上接受这些非流通股，因为这种情形导致的直接结果是，当公司发放股利时，他们会实现更高的投资报酬率。这一现象可能会在一定程度上打破有关股利分配的实证结果，即股权越集中，支付股利越少。控制股东握有大量不能交易的股票成为中国经济的特有现象，如果从追逐最大投资报酬率的角度讲，控制股东在一定范围内所持有股票数量越多，其越有可能要求公司发放更多的股利。这种情形在治理结构较差的我国上市公司中，可能会更为普遍。本文的结论表明上市公司的股权结构对其股利政策有明显的影响，这种影响不能描述为简单的线性关系，尤其是非流通股、第一大股东占比与股利支付率之间的关系，这取决与控制股东对股利流动性、支付股利的成本、以及通过股利而获得高额报酬率之间的“权衡”。一方面，按照传统观点，股利作为限制内部人攫取外部人利益的方式；另一方面，由于缺乏对投资者的保护，以及现金股利为控制股东带来的超额报酬率，股利当然也可能变成为上市公司控制股东攫取利益的手段。为了把这一问题解释清楚，本文运用了大量的回归方程，本文的实证研究显示：1.股利支付率与非流通股占比或者第一大股东持股比例（二者有相当大的一部分为相互重叠），呈“倒U”形关系，尽管支付率与第一大股东的负相关关系明显，但是本文仍然认为在负相关的起始位置会有个弯曲。 2.流通股占比越高，则公司受到的压力越大，也就越倾向于发放股利，与此相反，当第二大股东和第三大股东持股比例显著提高时，公司将减少发放股利。3.规模大的公司倾向于多发股利，资产负债率高的公司更愿意少发股利。当利润出现显著增长时，公司的股利支付率下降，但支付的股利绝对额有所提高。4.公司董事长与总经理兼任的现象在中国的上市公司中比较普遍，本文发现当二者不兼任时，公司倾向于少发股利。5.当政府控制上市公司时，他们除了要求支付股利以外，很少有办法能够把上市公司的资源转移到自己手中，而集团控股则可以很容易地通过关联方交易来实现资源的转移与攫取。所以政府控制上市公司时，公司的支付率明显比集团控制公司的支付率高。6.小股东控制的公司的股利支付率（13.23%）最大，这说明拥有大量流通股的小股东们会对公司施加压力，要求支付股利。这与本文的信号模型假设相一致，当然，这也是小股东在部分利益被攫取与全部利益被攫取之间的无奈选择。本文也发现财务困境或者融资次序偏好对一些公司的股利政策也是有影响的，小股东控制公司的估计支付率在当年利润下降时，仍然保持了较高的水平，而第一大股东控制的公司股利支付率则几乎相当于前者的1/5。本文的贡献主要体现在以下几个方面：第一，中国上市公司的代理成本的重点可能不是经理与股东之间的矛盾，也不是第一大股东与第二大股东之间的矛盾，更大的矛盾与利益攫取也许发生在非流通股（控制股东）与流通股（小股东）之间；第二，在一个小股东无法得到更周到保护的股票市场，股利作为传统的降低代理成本的手段，在中国由于股票之间的差别使其更有可能成为一把双刃剑；第三，本篇文章为证券市场的监管者，例如证券监督管理委员会的政策提供一些依据。监管者们应该调查公司股利政策中对小股东利益的攫取动机，并应重新考虑非流通股的价格折扣，还应该把消除股票之间的差别作为政策制订的根本目标。更多还原

【Abstract】 In most Anglo-Saxon countries like the US or UK stock ownership is often dispersed and it is claimed that each individual shareholder has only limited incentives and ability to monitor the management. The major con1ict in the governance of companies, accordingly, appears to be between powerful managers and small outside shareholders. Dividend pay-outs are seen as a means to reduce the cash 1ow that managers can use at their discretion (Jensen, 1986; Lang and Litzenberger, 1989). Governance in most other countries functions di6erently. In Japan and most of the South East Asian countries, business groups with their pyramidal and cross-ownership structures are common governance devices. In these countries legal requirements for management, often part of the controlling family, are rather weak (Claessens et al., 2000). In Continental Europe a concentrated ownership structure is the distinguishing feature and the corporate law again plays a minor role. Here, large shareholders have ample incentives and ability to control management, therefore, the classic manager–shareholder con1ict does not appear predominant. Due to the reduction of the free-rider problem of monitoring and/or the increased alignment of incentives, large shareholders potentially add value. Many authors, however, argue that there is a con1ict between the large controlling shareholder and small minority shareholders. That is, while largeshareholders may increase the size of the pie, private benefits of control that are not shared by minority shareholders may also increase （Boehmer ，1998）.In China, the controlling shareholders hold either state or institutional shares that are not tradable in the stock exchanges although all other rights are identical to those of the individual shares.1 Thus, these non-tradable shares have a significant price discount comparing with that of the individual shares. And just the phenomenon of “the same share,the same right, but the different price”leads to the separating of the different shareholders’ benefits. This share price difference gives rise to disproportionate return to investment that favors the controlling shareholders over the individual shareholders. Foreseeing this, the controlling shareholders are less constrained when they issue shares since first, they enjoy a discounted price, and second, they can get back disproportionate more money once dividends are distributed. This phenomenon would be more severe in firms with worse corporate governance. Our results indicate the share and ownership structures of the Chinese listed firms do have significant impact on their dividend policies,and this effect can’t be described as a simple linear relationship.On the one hand,dividends can be considered to constrain insider expropriation, on the other hand, due to the weak investor protection and disproportionate return from cash dividends that favors the controlling shareholders, dividends may be used as a way to tunnel resources from the listed companies to the controlling owners.In the analysis, there are so many regression equals that the conclusions can be described as followed：The relationship of payout and the untradble shares’proportion(or the first large shareholder’proportion) can be described as “inverse U”shape. Althought negative correlation of them is so significant, it will be considered that there is a curve at the beginning of the negative correlation in this paper.If the proportion of the tradble shares is hither, then the pressure of the firms will be heavier. It is different to this that if the second large and the third large shareholder’ proportion increase, the firms will decrease the dividends.The firms with large size tend to pay out more dividends, the firms with high leverage tend to pay out less dividends. When the profits of firms increase significantly, the payout ratio will drop, but the payout sums will enhance.It is usual in China that the board chairman and the general manager is the same one, and the conclusion is drawn that if they are not the same one ,then the fi更多还原