【作者】 向智勇；

【导师】 唐未兵；

【作者基本信息】 湖南师范大学 ， 产业经济学， 2004， 硕士

【摘要】 新古典经济学所描述的企业与现实经济中的企业相差甚远，但在新古典分析框架的形成和发展中论述过企业家的相关理论。西方经济学家大都把企业家定义为协调者、中间商、创新者或不确定性承担者，成为企业家涵义的主流解释。马克思尽管没有直接谈到企业家问题，但他对资本家协调企业内部分工、承担风险、技术创新等方面的分析明显具有企业家的内涵。我国经济学家对企业家理论的研究起步较晚，其研究大多建立在西方的企业家理论基础之上。国内学者对企业家问题的讨论一直与我国国有企业改革的实际紧密联系，在理论分析的基础上作出了不少的政策性贡献。本文在前人研究的基础上，把企业家界定为一种职业经理人。企业家是一种复合型的人力资源，对其他生产要素(包括一般人力资源)起着配置、协调和激发作用，从而成为经济发展的核心要素。企业家的形成不仅体现了个人禀赋特征，而且从某种程度上反映了制度效率，是“先天”与“后天”的共同结果。由于所有权与经营权的分离、信息非对称、代理成本以及个人的机会主义动机，随着现代公司制度的兴起，企业家的激励与约束问题日益成为实业界和理论界共同关注的焦点。企业家作为复合型的高级人才，从事复杂劳动，其行为具有不可监督性或监督成本太高，所以企业家激励机制应该以市场竞争、产权激励为主，以成就、自我实现、社会荣誉等激励为辅。企业家约束机制应主要体现在所有权约束、责任约束、预算约束、法律约束、道德约束等方面。国有企业改革不仅是一个重大经济问题，而且也是一个重大政治问题。构造我国国有企业企业家激励约束的总体思路是:保障市场经济改革的社会主义方向、鼓励制度创新、加强绩效考核、平衡把握激励与约束、长短期激励约束并举、物质与精神并重等。根据这些思路和原则，我国国有企业企业家的激励约束机制具体可以从以下几方面着手操作:年薪制、期权方案、管理层融资收购模式、建立与完善法人治理结构、职工民主监管、资本市场接管、银行债务约束、法制建设、建立与完善企业家市场。更多还原

【Abstract】 Enterprise described by new classical economics has much difference with that in realistic economy, but related theories on entrepreneur were stated in the process of formation and development of new classical analytic framework. Entrepreneur is defined by most western economists as coordinator, medium merchant, innovator or uncertainty burden, which becomes dominant explanation to the concept of entrepreneur. Although Marx did not explicate the problem on entrepreneur, his analysis has apparent comprehension of entrepreneur on capitalist’s function in an enterprise such as coordination, risk burden, technical innovation, etc. Researches on entrepreneur begin late in China and most of them are based on western entrepreneur theories. Discussion on entrepreneur among Chinese scholars has tight connections with the realities of state-owned enterprise reform in China, on which much strategic contribution is given on the basis of theoretical analysis. Entrepreneur is defined as professional manager in this paper on the basis of precursor’s study. Entrepreneur is a kind of compounded human resource, which allocates, coordinates and motivates other productive factors, thus becomes core factor in economic development. The formation of entrepreneur reflects not only individual ability features, but also institutional efficiency to some extent, so it is a result both in term of inborn and acquired. Due to the separation of ownership and administration, information asymmetry, agent cost and individual opportunism, the problem of entrepreneur incentive-restriction becomes focus in industrial circles and in theoretical circles with the rise of modern corporate institution, entrepreneurs are compounded talents whoare professional in complex labor. Since it is impossible to monitor their behavior or the monitor cost is too high, entrepreneur incentive mechanism should depend mainly on market competition and property rights incentive, subsidiarily on incentives such as achievement, self-realization and social honor. Entrepreneur restriction mechanism should depends mainly on property rights restriction, responsibility restriction, budget restriction, juristic restriction, moral restriction, etc. State-owned enterprise reform is not only an important economic problem, but also an urgent political matter. The overall measures to restructure entrepreneur incentive-restriction mechanism in state-owned enterprise are as following: sticking to socialist direction in market economy reform, encouraging institutional innovation, reinforcing performance tests, balancing incentive and restriction both in long and short run, combining material with spirit, etc. Followed by these principles, entrepreneur incentive -restriction mechanism in state-owned enterprises in China can be operated from the following aspects: yearly salary system, option schema, MBO mode, establishing and perfecting corporate governance structure, democratically monitoring employee, capital market takeover, bank debt restriction, legislation construction, establishing and perfecting entrepreneur market.更多还原