【作者】 白孝忠；

【导师】 周军；

【作者基本信息】 武汉理工大学 ， 产业经济学， 2004， 硕士

【摘要】 产业结构趋同与低度化是我国经济结构中长期存在的一个突出问题。当前，我国正处于经济发展的关键时期，对已有的产业结构进行战略性调整，以结构调整促进发展将成为新世纪中国经济运行的明显的特征。产业结构的调整过程，实际上也是各种经济主体利益的再分配过程。我国地域广阔，各地资源禀赋差异较大，地方政府不仅是地区范围内经济和社会事务的管理者，而且也是一级调控主体，直接参与一些经济活动，具有相对独立的经济利益。中央政府在调整产业结构和平衡产业布局时，必然要触及各个地区的经济利益，而地方政府为了维护各地区的局部利益，往往与中央政府及其他地方政府进行着各种形式的博弈活动，从而形成了产业结构调整中的地区利益障碍，加剧了产业结构的趋同及低度化。这就要求中央政府在尊重地区适当利益的基础上，正确处理产业结构政策同地区利益的矛盾，协调好整体与局部的关系，建立适合中国国情的利益协调模式和协调机制，最终通过利益协调来促进产业结构的调整，以保证国家产业结构政策在各地区的贯彻落实及调整目标的顺利实现。 全文分为四章。第一章对我国产业结构调整的现状及不合理现象进行了阐述，认为我国产业结构趋同与低度化，主要是各地地方政府为追求和维护地区局部利益所致。第二章分析了转型时期中央政府行政性分权中地方政府职能的演变及对地方经济的影响，并紧密围绕地区利益来考察地方政府在产业结构调整中的行为，进而把协调利益关系作为协调地方政府行为的前提。第三章简要介绍了博弈论的基本原理，并运用博弈论及博弈模型，对我国产业结构调整中各种政府主体的行为进行了剖析，论述了建立新型协调模式及协调机制的必要性。第四章通过对西方不同国家产业协调模式的比较分析，提出了我国产业协调的基本模式，在分析传统体制下地区利益矛盾协调手段失效的基础上，提出了中央政府应在地区之间建立两种新型的机制，即“利益分享机制”及“利益补偿机制”。更多还原

【Abstract】 An outstanding problem existing in the economic structure in China for a long time is assimilated and a low level in the industrial structure. In recent years, China is in a key time for economic development. It is an apparent characteristic for economic operation to strategically adjust the lied industrial structure and promote development by the adjustment of structure. The course of the adjustment in the industrial structure is exactly that of the interest reallocation among various economic bodies. China has a vast territory, and the difference in resources endowment is much big. Regional government is not only the supervisor of local economy and social activities, but also the first body of regulation and control, who directly participants in some economic interests. When the central government adjusts and balances industrial structure, he must touch economic interest in every region. In order to uphold their local interest, the regional governments usually engage in various game activities with the central government, which forms barriers of regional interest and intensifies its assimilation and a low level. The central government should handle the contradiction between industrial structure policy and regional interest , and coordinate the relation between the entity and the party on the basis of honoring suitable local interest. Therefore, we must establish the model and the mechanism of interest coordination to ensure the thorough implement and entire fulfilment of industrial structure policy in every region by coordinating interest to adjust industrial structure eventually.This thesis divides into four chapters. Chapter I explains the present condition and reasonlessness in the adjustment of industrial structure hi China, and reveals the deep-rooted reason on the assimilation and the low level of industrial structure is that the regional governments pursue and uphold their local interests. Chapter II analyses the evolution of local governments ’ function in the course of central government’s administration decentralization in transition period., and closely study the effect on local economy and the behaviors of localgovernment by local interest in the adjustment of industrial structure.. The relation on coordinating interest is regarded as the premise to the coordinating of the local governments’ behaviors. Chapter III introduces briefly the game theory and analyses strictly the behaviors of various economic bodies in the adjustment of industrial structure by game theory and models of game, on the basis of which we expound the necessity of setting up new coordination model and mechanism. Chapter IV puts forward essential coordination model of industry by the relative analysis of various industrial coordination models in west countries. The central government must establish two types of mechanism in coordinating interest-"interest-sharing mechanism" and "interest-compensating mechanism" owing to the failure of the contradiction coordination or regional interest in traditional system.更多还原