转轨时期我国征纳行为博弈分析

【作者】 陈云燕；

【导师】 刘蓉；

【作者基本信息】 西南财经大学 ， 财政学， 2004， 硕士

【摘要】 一、论文的主要内容及观点（一）税收征纳行为的理论分析征税人行为是税务机关作为税收管理部门，税务人员作为具体征税人员在组织税收收入过程中的一系列行为，其包括了从对纳税人征税到组织税款缴纳入库的整个过程。征税人行为是以国家法律法规赋予的权力为前提的行为,是征税机关对税收活动和纳税人做出的各种有意识的行为，这种行为是征税主体在征税过程中采取的征税遵从行为或征税不遵从行为。纳税人行为就是纳税人做出的行为，这种行为是与纳税事项相关的行为，是经济利益主体（即有应税收入或应税行为的个人或法人）受到某种内在驱使和外在诱因的刺激所做出的产生了某种社会经济影响的行为。纳税人行为是纳税人对税收活动和税务机关做出的各种有意识的行为，这种行为是以纳税人身份出现的各种利益主体在涉及税收问题时采取的纳税遵从行为或纳税不遵从行为。对于征税人而言，其目标模式是保证税收任务的顺利完成，确保自身利益；而对于纳税人而言，其目标模式则是尽可能地少交税，以实现自身利益的最大化。而税收征纳行为控制的最终目标应该是规范征纳双方行为，保证国家的税收收入及时、足额入库。由于征纳主体自身利益驱使和其他影响因素的存在，其目标模式与政府对征纳行为控制的最终目标存在着差异，这就需要对征纳行为进行规范和控制，使征纳主体在为实现自身利益最大化而行为的过程中，其行为朝着符合政府对其的控制目标发展。（二）我国税收征纳行为的博弈分析1．博弈论的引入博弈论（game theory）是研究决策主体的行为发生直接相互作用时候的决策以及这种决策的均衡问题的。也就是说，当一个主体，好<WP=4>比说一个人或一个企业的选择受到其他人、其他企业选择的影响，而且反过来影响到其他人、其他企业选择时的决策问题和均衡问题。所以说在这个意义上说，博弈论又称为“对策论”。按照不同的分类标准，博弈可以分为静态博弈和动态博弈、合作博弈和非合作博弈、完全信息博弈与不完全信息博弈、零和博弈、常和博弈和变和博弈。从博弈的分类来看，税收博弈属于零和博弈，在税收博弈中纳税人有所失，政府有所得，二者得失之和为零。税收博弈又是非对称信息博弈，在税收博弈中纳税人拥有政府不拥有的信息，政府与纳税人在拥有涉税信息方面是不对称的。税收博弈是一种重复博弈，即同样结构的博弈重复多次，前一阶段的博弈不改变后一阶段博弈的结构，所有参与人都观测得到博弈过去的历史。在税收征纳过程中，政府与纳税人都具有自身利益的相对独立的行为主体。政府要取得多少税收收入，纳税人要缴纳多少税，都有各自具体的行为目标；对政府来说，其策略是对什么征税、设置哪些税种、实行什么税率，以及采取什么征税方式和方法，以有效地获取税收收入和实现特定的调控目标。对纳税人来说，依法纳税、避税、欠税、偷税、骗税都是可供其选择的行为方式和策略。2．税收主体策略博弈分析文章通过税务稽查博弈模型，得出偷税成本越高，所偷税额越多，纳税人偷税的概率越小；而稽查成本越高，纳税人偷税的概率就越大的结论；通过征纳主体偷税的博弈分析，得出结论：当纳税人都为自身利益考虑并且存在着征税人寻租时，唯一的结果就是纳税人都采取“行贿”策略，同时因为税法中大量的税收优惠和减免规定，使这种情况发生的机率比较大。3．税收组织激励博弈分析文章通过税务机关内部激励博弈分析和政府与税务机关激励博弈分析，明确了要通过一个机制设计，将激励机制和处罚机制与征管活动的结果挂钩，用明确有效的奖惩办法对税收征收管理、依法行政、廉政建设等目标进行考核，以此来调动税务机关和税务人员加强征收管理的积极性，形成一个干事的好于不干事的“防偷懒”机制和干坏<WP=5>事的“受惩处”的机制的思路。同时指出在政府与征税人这对博弈中，政府的理智的选择应该是激励相容，征税人的理智选择是声誉效应（因为从长期看，代理人必须对自己的行为负完全责任，即使没有显形激励合同，代理人也要积极努力完成工作。这样做可以改进自己在代理人市场上的声誉，从而提高未来的收入），双方才能获得最大化效用。（三）转轨时期我国税收征纳行为的实证分析1．转轨时期我国税收征纳行为存在的主要问题由于我国的经济转轨表现为新体制的不断生长和旧体制的不断被取代，使得新经济环境下的主体行为模式受到传统的影响，其中既有对建立规范市场秩序有利的因素，也不乏种种“遗毒”。例如:(1)市场主体的法制意识不强。在计划经济时期,通常是以行政命令去规范市场主体的行为,人们的法制意识较弱,造成在转轨时期,无论是征税人,还是纳税人都不能很好地严格依照税收法律法规去进行征税和纳税,造成税收的流失；(2)道德意识的缺位。在经济转轨时期，原有的平均主义被打破，个人利益被提到了前所未有的高度，而相应的道德规范没有建立和发展，在缺乏道德约束的情况下，拜金主义开始膨胀，为了经济利益不择手段的事件时有发生，在税收方面则表现为纳税人想方设法进行偷逃税活动；（3）政府职能转换不到位。经济转轨的同时，政府的职能也应相应转变——从“运动员”转向“裁判员更多还原

【Abstract】 Ⅰ The significance of this thesisRevenue is becoming more and more important in the economic system of our country with the development of economic reform and the standardization of the government functions. However, tax evasion is still prevailing in our economy for many reasons although the government has taken strong measures against tax evasion. Of course, we have made some progress with the taxation system, but the result is not yet satisfactory. Therefore, The author hopes to find an analytical method that can relate each side of the taxation system relation with the tax evasion.In this thesis, the author tries to exercise the analytical method of “game theory” to analyse the difference between taxpayer’s behavior and tax-collector’s behavior. By the way of the game theory, the author hopes to find a way to restrain the behaviors of both sides, make them pay the tax on time and levy the tax according to the taxation laws.Ⅱ The basic methods and online of this thesisThe basic line of this thesis is as follows: Firstly, analyse the non-standard behavior of both sides; Secondly, exercise the analytical method of “game theory” in order to analyse the inner behaviour of both sides; Following this, optimize their behaviors through three aspect:the taxation consciousness, taxation system and taxation regulation.Ⅲ The main contents and view points of this thesis(a) The theoretic analysis of taxpayer’ behavior and tax-collector’ behaviorThe ultimate goal of restraining the behaviors of two sides is to standardize their behaviors so that the revenue is enough and is received on time. Taxpayer and tax-collector belong to different bodis,but they should be compatible with each other <WP=9>and cooperate with each other. Also, they have different objectives, therefore we should standardize their behaviors separately.(b) The game theory analysis of taxpayer’ behavior and tax-collector’ behaviorIn this thesis, the author mades a conclusion by the game theory model of taxation checking, that is, the more cost the tax evasion will pay, the more tax they will evade. Then the author makes another conclusion from the game theory model of collusion of taxpayer and tax-collector, that is, when all the taxpayers consider their benefit and all the tax-collectors do their best to seek benefit, the only result is all taxpayers will bribe the tax-collectors. Similarly, the author makes a conclusion from the game theory model of prompting the system in the revenue office and prompting system between government and revenue office. That is to say, the government should design a system that can relate the result of tax-collection to prompting and punishment. Therefore, by this system, the government can inspire the revenue office and tax-collectors to levy tax actively.(c) The real examples of taxpayer’s and tax-collector’ behavior analysis during the reforming time.The thesis enumerates some abnormal behavior of taxpayer and tax-collector. And it analyses its reason in depth.(d) The optimization of taxpayer’ behavior and tax-collector’ behavior1）Optimization of taxation consciousness. Make the taxpayers realize that the tax they pay is just the price they pay for the use of those public goods or public services. As a result, taxpayers will change their mind that paying tax is painful.2）Optimization of the taxation system. The author does not think a taxation system which is not in effect has any value, so the taxation system must harmonize with the tax-collection system. In this part, the author <WP=10>probes into the co-operation between the taxation system and tax-collection. 3）Optimization of tax-collection model. In this thesis, the author considers optimizing the tax-collection model through three aspect: supervising the source of tax, consummate the taxation checking system and service for the taxpayer.4）According to the result of “game theory” analysis, the author makes a conclusion that the government should enlarge the benefit to the taxpayer and the cost of tax e更多还原