不确定性与分成制契约下的代理人行为研究

【作者】 陈日清；

【导师】 王玉霞；

【作者基本信息】 东北财经大学 ， 产业经济学， 2003， 硕士

【摘要】 在委托代理理论中，分成制契约作为委托人就代理人因承担风险而给予的补偿机制而受到学者的日益重视。本文拟在委托代理理论和交易成本理论的框架下用经济学中广泛运用的随机最优控制理论，对不确定性与分成制契约条件下的代理人的行为选择及福利水平作一个比较深入的研究。 本文首先提出了研究的主题，概述了关于本文主题的理论进展及研究现状，并介绍了本文的研究视角；此后，本文通过构造一个数学模型，对分成制契约下的代理人行为进行了形式化、模型化的研究。本文的主要结论是：在所有外生条件不变的条件下，代理人的努力水平将始终不变，并且和分成制契约中规定的分成比例无关。为了使代理人提高努力水平，我们必然要改变代理人所处的经营环境。由本文的研究，代理人的努力水平除了与其规避风险程度的大小和主观贴现率的大小有关外，更为重要的是代理人所处环境的不确定性对于代理人的努力水平有重要的影响，当其经营产出的不确定性越大，其努力水平也就越高。另外，代理人禀赋与代理人的努力水平存在负相关的关系，而与代理人的福利水平正相关。 本文结构作如下安排： 第一部分是本文第1章，其主要内容是对有关分成制契约的理论进展及研究现状作一个总体的阐述，并且说明本文的研究目的及研究视角。 第二部分共分为两章(第2章、第3章)，这两章的主要内容是在委托代理理论和交易成本理论的框架下，通过构造一个经济学中广泛运用的随机最优控制模型，对在不确定性与分成制下的代理人行为作一个形式化、模型化的研究，以期望对分成制契约运行机理有一个更为清楚的认识。其中第2章是基本模型的构造与求解，第3章是扩展模型的构造与求解。 第三部包括第4章与结束语，其主要内容是对我国企业组织中激励机制的现状作一个简单的描述以及本文结论对我国企业组织中激励机制设计的借鉴、参考意义，并且对本文的主要结论及政策建议作一个简要的总结。更多还原

【Abstract】 In the principle-agent theory, the share contract, which is a mechanism of compensation for agent’s bearing risk, is increasingly focused by scholars. Under the analytical framework of the principal-agent theory and the transaction cost theory, this thesis will apply stochastic optimal control model to analyze the agent’s action and welfare under uncertainty and a share contract.Firstly, this paper has proposed the research theme, summarized the theory development and research status in quo and introduced the research angle of the paper; secondly, with constructing a mathematic model, this paper has analyzed the agent’s action under the share contract. The primary conclusions of the paper are as follows: with all the external conditions being constant, the agent’s level of effort will not change and will be independent of the proportion of the share contract. In order to increase this level, we have to change the agent’s operation situation. According to our study, the agent’s level of effort relates more to the uncertainty of the agent’s situation than to his risk-averse extent and his subjective discount rate. The more uncertainty of the agent’s production, the more endeavor of the agent In addition, the agent’s endowment has negative relation to his endeavor and has positive relation to his welfare.The structure of this paper is arranged as follows:Part I is Chapter I , which includes a general summarization of both the theory development and the research status in quo of the share contract theory , the research purpose and the research angle of this thesis.Part II is divided into two Chapters (Chapters II, Chapters III). Under the analytical framework of the principal-agent theory and the transaction cost theory, we have applied stochastic optimal control model to analyze theagent’s action and welfare under uncertainty and a share contract. Our purpose is to get a clearer recognition of the operation mechanism of the share contract. Chapters II is the formation and analysis of the basic model. Chapters III is the formation and analysis of the expanding modeLPart III is Chapter IV and Conclusions. In which we mention the status in quo of the incentive mechanism in Chinese enterprises and the consulting significance of this thesis to the incentive mechanism design in Chinese enterprise(Chapter IV). Finally we sum-up the primary conclusions and policy suggestions of this thesis (Conclusions).更多还原