我国政府间税收竞争问题研究

【作者】 石文雅；

【导师】 苑新丽；

【作者基本信息】 东北财经大学 ， 财政学， 2003， 硕士

【摘要】 在西方联邦制国家，如美国、加拿大、瑞士，地方政府具有相对独立的财政权限和支出责任，通过降低边际有效税率吸引居民、厂商和资本流入，是地方政府促进辖区发展的重要经济政策，由此而引起的政府间税收竞争是一个长期受到财政学者关注的问题。在我国改革开放之前，由于一直实行高度中央集权的财政管理体制，地方政府没有自身的经济利益和税收权限，也就不存在政府间税收竞争。改革开放以来，随着财政分权的逐步推进，尤其是分税制的确立，地方政府在财政支出上有了一定自主权，在取得收入上享有很大的自由裁量权，类似于西方联邦制国家的政府间税收竞争就应运而生了。如何认识、评价和规范我国政府间税收竞争成为一个迫在眉睫的问题。本文力图运用政府间税收竞争的一般理论，对我国政府间税收竞争问题进行研究，并提出规范我国政府间税收竞争的具体设想。 全文共分三个部分：第一部分介绍了政府间税收竞争的一般理论，包括政府间税收竞争的概念、理论基础、基本分类、效应分析、协调方法，是整篇文章的理论基点。第二部分是本文的重点所在。分析了我国政府间税收竞争的现状，包括我国政府间税收竞争的环境和特点、表现形式、竞争效应及原因分析。结论是我国政府间税收竞争主要是制度外的恶性竞争，原因在于分税制不完善、税收计划方法不科学且极具刚性、财政需求超越税收能力以及政府官僚的利己行为。第三部分针对我国政府间税收竞争存在的问题，借鉴有关国家协调税收竞争的方法，参照财政学者关于税收竞争的假设条件，提出了规范我国政府间税收竞争的相应对策。包括：转变政府职能，建立市场经济下的法治政府；深化分税制改革，规范政府间财政关系；改进税收计划管理，使税收计划服从经济税源；创造规范政府间税收竞争的基础条件。更多还原

【Abstract】 In western federal countries, such as America, Canada and Switzerland, subnational governments have their own fiscal jurisdiction and expenditure responsibilities, reduction in marginal effective tax rate in order to attract in inhabitants, business and capital is an important economic policy strategy to boost local development, and subnational tax competition coming from this has long been a problem to which fiscal scholars pay much more attentions. In our country, before the Reform and Opening-up, the fiscal management has always been a deeply centralized one, in which subnational governments have no their own fiscal interest and tax jurisdiction, so there has been no subnational tax competition whatsoever. Ever since the Reform and Opening-up took place, along with the process of fiscal decentralization, especially the establishment of the tax-divided system, subnational governments have been awarded some power in fiscal expenditure and gotten wide informal discretionary powers in collecting fiscal revenue. So subnational tax competition analogous to the one in western federal countries has come into being. How to acknowledge, evaluate and regulate the subnational tax competition in our country has been an urgent problem put forward. This thesis attempts to use the general theories of subnational tax competition to study the subnational tax competition in our country, and put forth some concrete tentative plans to regulate it.The whole thesis is divided into three chapters: The first one introduce the general theories of subnational tax competition, which includes the definition, the theoretical bases, the principal categories, the effect and harmonization of subnational tax competition. This is the theoretical foundation of the whole thesis. The second one is the emphasis. In the chapter, the writer has analyzed the actuality of subnational tax competition in our country, including the surrounding and characteristic, the special forms, the competitive effect and the cause of the subnational tax competition. The conclusion is that the subnational tax competition in our country is a harmful competition out of rules, and the cause lies in theimperfection of tax-divided system, the rigidity of unscientific taxation planning, the fiscal demand exceeding tax capacity and the personal incentive of government official. The final chapter of the thesis puts forward countermeasures to resolve problems the informal subnational tax competition has brought, using the foreign successful experience of tax harmonization for reference and consulting to the necessary conditions fiscal scholars have set to a perfect subnational tax competition, which includes the transformation of government function to set up a administrative system ruling by law accord with market economy; deepening the reform of tax-divided system to regulate intergovernmental fiscal relationship; improving the management of taxation planning to make it subordinated to economic tax resource; creating fundamental conditions beneficial to subnational tax competition and so on.更多还原