【作者】 董莉莉；

【导师】 吴兴南；

【作者基本信息】 福州大学 ， 社会学， 2004， 硕士

【摘要】 农民负担是具有农村户口的公民无偿向国家、集体和社会提供的剩余价值的总和，包括费用、劳务和产品三种形式，是农民生产成果社会再分配的重要组成部分。在我国农民负担问题是一个“厚积而薄发”的社会问题。随着我国加入WTO和进入全面建设小康社会的发展新阶段，"三农"问题的现实严峻性和极端重要性日益凸现。如何破解“三农”难题也成为党的十六届三中全会的重要议题。农民负担过重问题的本身是社会冲突，是政府与农民之间围绕农业税收、农业利益展开“博弈”的结果。该问题的形成，与政府同农民之间不平等交易秩序中事实存在的非均等交换有着密切关系。博弈论以其理性假设及其认为决策主体之间的决策彼此依赖的观点而日益受到人们的关注和青睐。它首先在经济学中得到系统阐述和运用，但是它与社会学中的功利主义观点——具体来说是与理性理论中的社会交换理论和起源于政治学也应用于社会学的公共选择理论 “不谋而合”，相互贯通、借鉴、融合。本文从社会学角度出发，尝试应用博弈论对农民负担问题做出探讨。“三农”问题有深刻的社会根源。其原因流程是：制度基础——行为抉择——结构设置——运行绩效。因此，"三农"问题发展到如此严重的地步，从根源上讲，是由于制度创新的弱化，以及由此引起的政策效应递减。制度因素中最根本的是我国的二元结构式的社会设置，这是人为政策的结果。而使我国社会长期以来对农民问题上出现指导思想偏差的因素则有两个：因素之一是我国两千年封建社会里“愚民”的政策传统和思想遗留；因素之二在于对苏联模式的简单仿效，而马克思主义中对农民问题的思想偏差也毫无保留地被应用于我国的社会主义建设实践中。政府与农民之间的博弈在中国将经历潜伏期、凸现期、炽热期、缓和期四个阶段。政府与农民之间的博弈属于不完全信息动态博弈。由于博弈双方的地位不同，二者之间的博弈实际上是一个强权博弈。政府与农民在权力分配、信息、组织化程度和交易费用方面都存在不对称现象。在双方博弈之初，拥有权力的<WP=3>一方——政府就利用手中的强权设下了有利于自身的交易秩序（社会设置体系）。这是农民博弈“失败”的制度根源，也是后期博弈的环境基础。农民负担是人类历史进程中客观存在的社会现象，是社会分工与合作过程中，农民与其他社会群体交换劳动成果所伴生的一种利益失衡的结果。政府在其中只是起调度作用，但是这一作用是人类社会发展所必需的。然而在当前社会设置的约束下，政府行为渐行渐远，发生扭曲，地方政府在运行中成为专政机关而不是为人民服务的机构。政府行为的 “异化”既是政府对社会的偏离也是社会对农民的偏离。由此，政府与农民之间的博弈成为畸形博弈。解决农民问题的根本在于制度创新，实现制度的变迁（不管是强制性还是诱致性的），为减负提供长久而有效的激励机制。此外，政府改革是农民减负运动中的关键之一，经济发展是前提和保证。针对我国农业属于弱质产业、农民处于极度弱势地位的事实，还应逐步建立社会安全阀制度，并尽快培育具有现代素质的农民。解决农民负担问题是一个持久的过程，我们需要有打持久战的思想准备。但是从另一方面看，这一问题由于长期积累，矛盾相当尖锐，解决这一问题又是刻不容缓的。减轻农民负担是一项复杂的改革，涉及面广，矛盾较多，牵一发而动全身，稍有不慎，就可能引发新的矛盾，因此减轻农民负担工作成为一项宏大的系统工程。我们既要考虑一些更全面、更深刻、更着眼于大局的综合性配套措施，也要做针对性的对策思考。标本兼治，才能控制住农民负担的总水平，保证农业经济发展、农民生活改善和农村社会稳定。更多还原

【Abstract】 The peasants’ load, as an important form of redistribution of the peasants’ output among the whole society, is the sum total of surplus value rendered gratis by citizens of rural residence. It realizes in three ways: fees, services and output. As a settle practice it is hard to reform. The importance and urgency to solve the three-problems concerning peasants surges increasingly with our entry into WTO and our progress to build a well-to-do family all over China. On the Third Plenary Session of the Sixteen Central Committee how to solve this problem became an important subject under discussion. The problem of the heavy load of the peasants is social conflict itself, resulting from the game between the government and the peasantry on agricultural taxation and interest. It originates from the disparity in essentially unequal transaction order between the two sides.The game theory has won recognition and favor increasingly these years for its rational hypothesis and its proposition on the interdependence of the policy-makers’ decisions. It was first exemplified and utilized systematically in economics, yet it holds the same idea by coincidence with utilization in sociology, to be more exact, social exchange in rational theories and public selection originates from politics. These two are analogous, referring to and merging with each other.This problem of heavy load is deeply rooted in the society, whose evolution process is like this: system foundation----acting choice----structure organization----operating effectiveness. Why this problem has developed into such a severity, originally it is because of the avianizing of regulation innovation and the resulted decreasing effectiveness of policies.Among the elements of policy the fundamental one is the binary social organization coming from artificial decisions. The reasons of the deviation of guiding ideology upon the peasantry in China are the following: one is the tradition and ideological remains of policy of obscuration in the 2000 years’ feudalism in China; the other is simplified imitation of Soviet’s model; errors in dealing with the peasantry in Marxism is also used in socialist construction without alteration. Game between the government and the peasantry in China is supposed to experience the periods of incubation, protrusion, upsurge and alleviation.The game is the dynamic game of incomplete information. It is in essence the game of power, as there is disequilibrium between the two sides in power, information, organization<WP=5>and trading fees. At the very beginning, the powerful side---the government--- has used its power to establish a transaction order advantageous to itself (the social organization system). This is the policy origin of the failure of peasants in the game, also the environmental foundation of later sets.The peasants’ load, result of social division and cooperation of labor, is an objective historical phenomenon along side with the progress of the society. During the exchange of output from labor among peasants and other components of society the government functions as a dispatcher, a role inalienable to the development. Under the restrain of the present social order the government conduct gradually drifts off and even twists, so that the local government in its evolution becomes the organ of dictatorship not of service provider. The alienation of government conduct is not only deviation of government from society but also that of society from the peasantry. Thus the game is deformed.The solvent of the problem lies in innovation of policies, betterment of regulations (whether coercive or inducing) and the inspiring system for lightening the load. The reform of the government, too, is crucial. Economical development is prerequisite and insurance. In view of our agriculture as a fragile industry and our peasantry all the more frail being, it is also necessary to build safety valve system and to cultivate peasants with modern level of competence.It is a long process to lighten the peasants’ load so we have to pre更多还原