论国有企业人力资本的产权激励

【作者】 郭娟；

【导师】 刘辉煌；

【作者基本信息】 湖南大学 ， 西方经济学， 2003， 硕士

【摘要】 二十世纪六十年代兴起的人力资本理论研究证明了人力资本是生产要素中最活跃、最特殊的因素，是经济增长的原生动力，但忽视了对人力资本激励问题的研究。越来越多的事实表明：除了人力资本存量以外，人力资本效率的发挥更是一国经济发展和企业经济绩效提高的决定性因素。由于人力资本是一种“主动资产”，其载体完全控制着资产的开发和利用，使其难以监督且难以准确度量，人力资本非“激励”难以调度，因此，在人力资本的投资、使用等过程中，首先要解决的是激励机制问题，只有充分调动人力资本载体的积极性和创造性，国家的经济才会发展起来，企业的效率才会提高。而激励问题在本质上是产权安排问题，人力资本的有效激励取决于一个有效的产权安排。 从我国国有企业特定的角度来看，企业的剩余控制权和剩余索取权安排处于一种分离或不对应的状态，人力资本所有者的产权要求和应得利益没有得到充分体现，从而导致激励的缺失。而这又是导致国有企业经济绩效低的关键原因。因此，改革国有企业的产权制度与产权结构，实行人力资本持股，实现人力资本所有者对企业所有权(包括剩余控制权和剩余索取权)的分享是解决国有企业人力资本激励缺失、提高企业经济绩效的有效措施。 本文通过分析人力资本对技术进步和物质资本效率的促进作用以及人力资本自身所具有的收益递增的特点，阐述了人力资本对于提高企业经济效率所起的关键性作用；并以企业的生产性质和交易性质以及人力资本的产权特性、专用性与群体性、剩余创造性、投资特性为基础，分析了对人力资本实行产权激励的必要性；运用实证的方法着重分析了我国国有企业人力资本激励机制的现状和激励缺失的原因，概括分析了国有企业人力资本激励缺失所导致的种种不良影响；最后，论文建立了人力资本持股模型，量化人力资本对企业历史贡献的积累，以此划分每个人力资本所有者应得的企业资产份额，并提出了结合模型解决国有企业激励缺失所需的一系列配套改革措施。更多还原

【Abstract】 In 1960’s, the economics proved that human capital is the most active and particular factor in production. But they paid no attention to the problem of how to incentive human capital. In fact, not only the amount of human capital, but also the effective utilizing of it is the most crucial factor that decides the economic performance. And because the owner of human capital-human being controls the capital completely, it is necessary to incentive not to monitor human capital. The more effective the incentive mechanism, the more fully the utilizing of human capital. And The efficient promotion of human capital depends on an efficient property right arrangement.As a matter of fact, human capital in state-owned enterprises is not motivated well for the non-correspondence of property rights. And this leads to the poor economic performance of the enterprises. To deal with the problem and enhance enterprises’s performance, the property right system and property right structure should be reformed and the policy of the shareholding of human capital should be carried out.The thesis relates to the following problems: Firstly, what is the relation between human capital and the efficiency of enterprises? Secondly, why it is necessary to incentive human capital through sharing the property rights of the enterprises? Thirdly, what are the main reasons for the inefficient motivation mechanism in state-owned enterprises and what are the adverse effects of it? After completing all of the above discussion, the thesis will make empirical research into the problem of how to arrange the sharing of the property rights of state-owned enterprises to incentive human capital efficiently. To put it in detail, the owner of human capital of state-owned enterprises should be permitted to participate in sharing the residual claim in order to match with the residual rights of control. So we put forward a relevant measure to resolve this problem. Of course, in order to have satisfactory effect, the above reform measure should be co-operative with other reform measures such as the revise of the law and so on.更多还原