【作者】 陈琼蓉；

【导师】 张徽燕；

【作者基本信息】 电子科技大学 ， 工商管理， 2003， 硕士

【摘要】 建立健全我国国有商业银行经营者的激励约束机制，是市场化经济改革和国际化发展中的一个必然的过程,对我国经济的改革与发展有着重要的作用。本文论述的是，在当前条件下，国有商业银行如何建立既合理又具有中国道德观念、文体传统的经营者激励约束机制。一个具有生命力的国有商业银行经营者激励约束机制至少应该解决如下问题：（1）让具有能力的经营者能充分发挥其能力，而没有真才实学的经营者很快被淘汰出局；（2）所有者在对经营者的放权过程中能够获得有效的监督权，而经营者在获得一定经营权的同时又不得不接受严格的所有者的监督；（3）能够根据国有商业银行经营者的需求出发，其所获得的奖酬与国家利益能达到正比关系，能让经营者对国有商业银行的长期发展所做的决策都是符合国家意愿的；（4）严格的科学的经营者目标责任制必须以战略实施为导向、科学的考核以及坚持“三公”原则。本论文的主要内容如下：1、 对激励理论与产权经济学、交易成本经济学和管理学关于激励约束的观点进行必要性的简评性回顾，指出对国有商业银行经营者激励机制与约束机制并存2、 从美国、日本、中国股份制商业银行经营者的选拔、激励、约束机制的对比出发，讨论建立与完善国有商业银行经营者的激励约束机制3、 从国有商业银行现状、激励约束机制的具体情况及对经营者的不良贷款率激励约束机制出发，提出了建立与完善国有商业银行经营者激励约束机制的方法4、 如何根据我国国有商业银行经营者的实际情况，建立与完善国有商业银行经营者激励约束机制<WP=4>本论文根据本人学习中领会的理论基础及本人在工作中所取得的经验，对商业银行经营者激励约束机制理论提出了以下新观点：1、根据当今激励力度较大的美国经济所出现的经营者约束不力所产生的经济丑闻，提出经营者的绩效函数的基本公式应为：P=f（M*β+N*α）*Ab (β+α=1)（N为约束水平），而不是P=f（M*Ab） 2、在波特-劳勒模型的基础上建立了经营者激励约束综合模型。3、根据国有商业银行不良贷款率建立国有商业银行经营者激励约束相容机制。4、提出我国国有商业银行经营者激励约束机制应因地制宜，不可一刀切。更多还原

【Abstract】 It is an inevitable course to set up and apply the incentive and constraint mechanism to the managers of state-owned commercial banks in our country, as the market-oriented economical transition process. What my article expanded is: under the condition proceed, how to set up a rational incentive and compatible constraint mechanism to the exacting of state-owned commercial banks, which can be applied and in line with the treads of international best practice. As to the state-owned commercial banks with vitality, the incentive and constraint mechanism should solve four problems at lest: (1) how to make the capable managers be able to give full play to their managerial abilities and the persons without genuine talent be recognizable and eliminated quickly ；(2) The owners can obtain effective authority to supervise managers behavior and their performance in the process of their shifting the right to the managers. While the managers have to accept the owners’ strict supervision after obtaining managerial power； (3)<WP=6>According to the demand of the managers of state-owned commercial banks, make their award and shareholders’ interests to reaches the direct radio relation, and make the managers’ decision about long-term development of state-owned commercial banks accordance with the shareholders’ will；(4) A strict scientific target accout-ability systems of the managers must take strategy implementation as the direction, can carry on the scientific examination, and adheres to the principles of " openness, fairness and honesty"。 Based on the incentive viewpoints and the theory of the transaction cost, I introduce that the managers of state-owned commercial banks should be motivated and restricted in a way. Through comparing the system of managers’ singling out, motivation and restriction in America, Japan and China, we should establish and complete the mechanism to the managers of state-owned commercial banks . Thinking about present condition of our state-owned commercial banks, the present the incentive and constraint mechanism to the managers and mal-loan coefficient, to establish and complete the incentive and constraint mechanism to the managers of state-owned commercial banks . How to establish and complete the incentive and constraint systems to managers of state-owned commercial banks in terms of the present<WP=7>condition of managers of our state-owned commercial banks. On the grounds of my theory basis which I attained during my studying and my experience from working, I will replenish the theory of the incentive and constraint mechanism to the managers of state-owned commercial banks in my article:1、In America, managers are subject to high level of incentive but at the same time they are restricted so little that financial scandals turn up. In terms of this phenomenon, I define a function of operator’s efficiency: P=f（M*β+N*α）*Ab (β+α=1)(N is the level of restriction) I do not approve the other function: P=f（M*Ab）.2、I establish synthetic model of the incentive and constraint on basis of Lauren’s model.3、In accordance with mal-loan coefficient, I establish the incentive constraint mechanism to the managers of state-owned commercial banks and find the point which connects the incentive and constraint to managers of varying state-owned commercial banks.4、I expound we should establish the incentive and constraint mechanism to the managers of state-owned commercial banks on the grounds of varying circumstance, should not make it rigidly uniform.更多还原