【作者】 龚慧明；

【导师】 隋广军；

【作者基本信息】 暨南大学 ， 产业经济学， 2003， 硕士

【摘要】 本文在审视第三方物流的基础上，根据学术界对第三方物流的定义，从第三方物流的契约特征入手，运用博弈论原理研究第三方物流现象，将第三方物流契约双方的委托代理关系归结为一个二阶段博弈。 首先分析一次博弈下的第三方物流，通过逆向推理求解出一个次优的纳什均衡，双赢的交易未能发生。来自外界的第三方约束和来自道德的软约束改变了博弈双方的收益，进而改变当事人的战略选择，实现帕累托改进。但由于信息不对称和交易成本的存在，外界约束需要成本，一次博弈注定会因为当事人的机会主义行为导致交易失败。 重复博弈能够给予当事人一个长远的预期，从而解决上述委托代理问题。因此在契约不完全条件下，作为委托代理关系的第三方物流必须要有一个重复博弈的制度环境即信用机制。但重复博弈必须保证触发战略的有效性。 最后本文提出在第三方物流实践中，在建设信用机制的基础上要注重培养健康的行业文化等可行制度建议。更多还原

【Abstract】 After survey of Third Party Logistics, this thesis start to study the phenomenon with the contractual characteristic of Third Party Logistics by Game Theory, conclude the relations of the two contractual parties to a Two-stage Game.Firstly, we analyze Third Party Logistics in the condition of the Simple Game, a suboptimal Nash Equilibrium is drawn by Negative Reasoning and no win-win trade appears. The restriction from the third party and in moral changes the payment of two parties and then their strategy choice is changed, Pareto Improving realized. But because of the Asymmetric Information and the Transaction Costs, the parties’ Opportunism Behavior will be destined to lead the transaction to fail.The long-term expectation can be given to the parties in the Repeated Game, and which will resolve that Principle-Agent problem. So, Third Party Logistics as a Principle-Agent relationship need an institutional environment of Repeated Game in the case of Incomplete Contract, that is Credit Institution. But the Trigger Strategy must be effective in Repeated Game.Also at last, some feasible advice, especially the healthy Industrial Culture in the basis of construction of Credit Institution, is brought forward in the practice of Third Party Logistics.更多还原