中国企业家绩效考评与薪酬制度设计研究

【作者】 徐向龙；

【导师】 金喜在；

【作者基本信息】 东北师范大学 ， 政治经济学， 2003， 硕士

【摘要】 在现代企业经营战略过程中，企业家起着举足轻重的作用，企业家人力资本是企业可持续竞争优势的最终来源，是维持企业持续的企业竞争优势的根本保证。随着现代企业组织形式的发展与企业所有权和控制权的分离，职业经理人阶层出现，随之产生所有者和经营者目标和利益不一致和两者间信息不对称问题。在市场信息不对称和企业家资源稀缺的情况下，充分承认和尊重企业家人力资本的特性与价值，运用科学的方法对企业家行为及其成果进行合理的考评，并据此建立一套切实可行、科学合理的企业家的绩效考评体系和薪酬报酬方案，实现对企业家有效的激励与约束，从而提升企业整体竞争实力、解决委托——代理问题是所有市场经济国家企业必须解决的问题。 中国现行企业家业绩考评和分配机制缺乏激励、约束效果，企业家根本利益得不到有效的保障，中国企业在激烈的企业家人力资本的市场竞争中处于极其不利的地位，激励约束问题已成为中国企业长期持续健康发展的内部瓶颈。诸多问题的存在不仅是对我国现有企业家绩效考评体系及企业家薪酬制度方案的质疑，更是对我们提倡的“按劳分配”为主体的分配制度的挑战。 论文共分四个部分，第一部分，相关基础理论介绍及研究现状评析。介绍企业家人力资本理论和委托代理理论，对国内外相关研究成果加以对比分析；第二部分，中国企业家薪酬实施现状与问题分析。在委托代理理论的指导下，结合实际对中国企业家绩效考评和薪酬制度设计存在的问题及问题产生的原因进行了深入地分析；第三部分，中国企业家绩效考评及薪酬制度设计。在明确企业家绩效考评与薪酬制度设计理论分析框架的基础上，根据绩效考评与薪酬制度设计应遵循的原则，对企业家业绩考评的评价指标、实施主体、企业家薪酬设计过程、中国企业家薪酬设计指标体系及企业家报酬方案构成进行了研究；第四部分，对中国企业家绩效考评及薪酬制度设计实施提出了诸多建设性的对策建议。更多还原

【Abstract】 Among the modern enterprise’s management strategy, the entrepreneurs play a very important role, Entrepreneur abilities are not only the final source of enterprise sustainable advantages to compete, but also the fundamental guarantee that lasting competition advantage of enterprise. With the development of modem enterprise’s organization form and the separation between the owner and manager, Professional manager stratum appears, Problems about inconsistent goal and interests between owner with operator, and information asymmetry issue between the two also appeared. In the situation that information asymmetry and entrepreneur resource is rare, acknowledge and respect entrepreneur manpower characteristic and value of capital fully, Use scientific method carry on rational checking and rate to entrepreneur behavior and his achievement, Set up a feasible science rational performance of entrepreneur check, Form a remuneration salary system, Realize to promote entrepreneur effective encouragement, Restraint enterprise compete, solve trusting wholly agent problem, these are all problems that all market economy enterprise must solve.China current entrepreneur achievement check and assign mechanism are lack of encourage and restrain result, Entrepreneur fundamental interests can not get effective guarantee, Chinese entrepreneur are in extremely unfavorable status among the manpower capital market competition which entrepreneur is fierce rare, Encourage and restrain have become a bottleneck of the Chinese enterprise lasting development for a long time. Existence of the question is not only an assess to the system of our country existing entrepreneur and salary query, but also a challenge of distribution system for "distributing according to work" that we recommend even more.Thesis is divided into four parts: The first part is the recommend of the relevant basic theories and the studies of current analysis situation. Introduce entrepreneur manpower capital theory and agency agreement theory, and do some analyses of the compare relevant research results between the domestic and international; the second part is the studies about the current situation ofthe Chinese entrepreneur. Under the theory of agency agreement, I will do some analyses to the existing problem of the performance check and salary system design of the Chinese entrepreneur; the third part is design of Chinese entrepreneur’s assess and salary system. In this part I will define theory analyze frame between the entrepreneur performance check and system design, according to the system design principle, do some deep studies about the entrepreneur evaluation achievement checks and rate, implement subject, process of entrepreneur salary design, the indexes of system design and the form of entrepreneur’s remuneration scheme; The fourth part, constructive suggestions to Chinese entrepreneur’s assess performance and salary system design.更多还原