利润共享与企业的治理结构

【作者】 蒲国蓉；

【导师】 任治君； 姜凌；

【作者基本信息】 西南财经大学 ， 西方经济学， 2003， 硕士

【摘要】 作为一种特定的企业制度形式，国有企业的行为方式与经营绩效，与我国特定的经济发展阶段、体制背景等因素密不可分。随着经济体制的变化，国有企业的改革成为经济体制改革的重要组成部分。国有企业的改革以“试点--修正--推广”这种渐进的模式进行。经过20多年不断地探索与总结，在推行放权让利、利改税、承包制、股份制试点之后，到1992年确立了以建立现代企业制度为国有企业的改革目标。但是在国有企业改革取得了一定成效的同时，也不断出现了一些问题，其中最主要的是国有资产经营的低效率未能得到有效解决，并且出现了严重的侵蚀国有资产利益的“内部人控制”问题，而试图解决这些问题的努力又往往导致体制的复归。在对国有企业进一步改革的探索中，又出现了企业所有权究竟应安排给人力资本所有者还是非人力资本所有者的争论。并且，企业剩余控制权和剩余索取权的配置是公司治理结构的核心和关键，如何配置这些权力是提高企业绩效，保护投资者利益的关键问题。本文围绕这些问题，从历史演进的动态角度出发，运用规范分析和实证分析，并借鉴现代企业理论的研究成果以及其它国家企业中利益共享模式的实践，对利益共享与企业的治理结构的理论问题进行探索。并且在一般理论分析的基础上，分析我国企业治理结构方面的改革，旨在推进企业制度的创新，完善我国国有企业的治理机制。本文首先从一般的理论角度出发分析了企业的治理结构。按照现代企业理论，企业是一系列要素所有者之间的不完备契约的连结，是这组合约履行的过程。由于信息是不充分并且不对称的，要素所有者将要素使用权投入企业时所达成的契约也就不可能完善。契约的这种不完全性必然会产生剩余权利（剩余控制权和剩余索取权），从而剩余控制权和剩余索取权的配置成为企业治理结构的核心；契约的这种不完全性必然使企业的要素投入者之间存在着再谈判机制，从而在企<WP=3>业的运行过程中便存在着一种互动关系。并且，从企业的契约性出发，企业的利益相关者之间的这种互动关系必然会内生出企业的治理结构。在治理结构中，我们主要关心剩余控制权和剩余索取权如何在各利益相关者之间进行配置。本文坚持治理结构决定的均衡思路，分析各个试图达到自身效用最大化的要素所有者如何达成均衡的契约。基于对企业性质的理解，本文对企业的资本结构进行了分析，将企业的资本结构分为人力资本和非人力资本以及组织资本，并区分了资本与资产，并将企业的利益相关者界定为股东、经理和雇员。各要素所有者将自己所拥有的要素使用权通过合约投入企业，其目的是要获得要素在未来的增值，从而企业这组合约的关键内容之一就是要明确如何安企业的剩余索取权。又由于契约的不完全性，当未约定的状态出现时，就出现了剩余控制权的安排问题，这是企业这组合约的另一关键内容。企业的各要素提供者通过一组不完备的合约联系在一起，成为了企业的利益相关者。在企业的运行过程中，要素提供者即利益相关者之间必然会存在着一种再谈判机制，谈判的结果由利益相关者的特征和外部环境所决定。本文运用Nash谈判模型及其推广模型分析利益相关者各自的效用目标，并使用该模型分析其谈判过程和谈判结果。利益相关者之间的合约及合约履行过程中的再谈判机制必然内生出企业的治理结构。企业的治理结构是否有效，应以企业所取得的绩效、以是否带来劳动生产率的提高为标准来进行评价。本文认为企业作为要素之间的合约的履行过程，其所有权不应只属于某一种要素，从而企业的利润也由其投入要素所共享，因此，本文详细讨论了利润共享与劳动生产率之间的关系，认为某些适度的利润分享与劳动生产率之间存在着一定的正向关系。进一步，分析了利润共享模式在美国、日本和欧洲大陆等国家和地区的实践，并指出，在国有企业的改革过程中，不能忽视相关利益各方的谈判力和利益要求，应从利益相关者的角度出发，找出有效的改革途径。在上述理论分析之后，本文对我国国有企业的改革过程进行了回顾，并分析了每一过程所取得的绩效以及所存在的问题，然后对进一<WP=4>步的改革提出自己的建议。我国的国有企业是与集中的计划经济体制相适应的。国家的发展战略、资源条件的约束和意识形态等因素决定了我国国有企业的特点：（1）国有资产的最终所有者是全体人民，由于全体人民缺乏行为能力，从而导致“所有者缺位”；（2）由于国有资产的权利实际附属于行政体系，国有企业由行政部门主管，因此国有企业的突出特点是“政企不分”；（3）国有企业既要提供赢利性的私人产品，又要提供非赢利性的公共产品，负有完成政策的责任，因此国有企业有着较重的政策性负担；（4）计划经济体制使国有企业长期处于没有市场的环境中，从而不具有竞争性。在国有企业改革的过程中，由于缺乏使得各利益主体效用最大化与国有资产运营效率提高相统一的条件，下放的权利因缺乏有效的监督而不断地被收回，因此国有企业的改革便不断出现反复。进一步的改革需要理清政府与企业的关系，政府只是改革主体的一方而不是唯一主体；其次要激励企业经营者，并要保证职工的利益。改革的实践也证明了相关?更多还原

【Abstract】 Profit-shaving and Corporate Governance StructureThe reform of State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) has been conducted in a step-by-step approach of "Experimenting - Adjusting - Spreading". After more than twenty years’ exploration and experiences in the measures of "decentralization and profit-sharing approach", "replacing the submitting of profits with the paying of taxes", "contract system" and "stock corporation system", it was set as the target of SOEs’ reform to establish a modern enterprise institution in 1992. While some achievements were made in the SOEs’ reform, there appeared some problems, among which the most important one was that the low-efficiency of state-owned-assets (SOAs) had not been solved effectively. The second was the embezzlement of state properties and profits by "insider control". And the efforts to solve these problems often led to the systematical restoration. On further probing into the SOEs’ reform, there came to the argument about whether the enterprises should be owned by labor-capital owners or by non-labor-capital owners. Furthermore, the allocation of the residual claims and rights of control was the core of the corporate governance. How to allocate these claims and rights was crucial to improve the enterprises’ performance and protect investors’ benefits. Referring to the above-mentioned problems, the essay made use of criterion analyzing and positive analyzing approaches, the research achievements in modern corporate theories and practice of profit-sharing approach in other countries’ enterprises to dynamically study on the theories of profit-sharing and corporate governance. Meanwhile, the essay analyzed the reform of corporate governance in China on the base of common theoretical analysis in order to push forward the innovation of corporate system and improve the current corporate governance system of China.<WP=7>The essay first analyzed the corporate governance structure from the common theoretical point of view. According to the modern firm theory, enterprise is a nexus of a set of incomplete contracts between the factor-owners, and the course of the implementation of the contracts. The allocation of the residual rights (residual claims and rights of control) arising from the incomprehension of the contracts is the core of the corporate governance. The existence of the incomprehension certainly results in the possibility of renegotiation system between factor-investors, thus bringing an interactive relationship between them into being. Moreover, thanks to the contractual nature of enterprise, the interactive relationship between the beneficiaries of the enterprise certainly leads to the endogeny of corporate governance. As for the corporate governance, we mainly concentrated on allocation of the residual claims and rights of control between the beneficiaries. The essay adhered to the equilibrium approach to the determination on corporate governance to illustrate how the factor-owners trying to maximize their own income and welfare arrived at equilibrium contracts. On understanding the nature of enterprise, the essay analyzed the capital structure of enterprise, and divided it into labor-capital, non-labor-capital and organizational capital. The essay also distinguished capital from assets, and defined the beneficiaries of the enterprise as stock-holders, manager and employees. Enterprise is a contract between factor-owners, and the core of the contract is the allocation of the residual claims and rights of control. With the use of Nash Negotiation Approach and its extended approach., the essay then analyzed the beneficial goals of various beneficiaries and their negotiation process and results. The essay put forward the opinion that enterprise, which is regarded as the implementation of a contract between factors, should not been owned by any particular factor, thus the profit of the enterprise should be shared by all factors. Thereby, the essay<WP=8>illustrated in detail the relationship between profit-sharing and productivity.Following the above analysi更多还原