中国资本市场：进入管制与市场绩效

【作者】 孙芳伟；

【导师】 许卓云；

【作者基本信息】 华南师范大学 ， 政治经济学， 2002， 硕士

【摘要】 近十年来，中国资本市场发展非常迅速，成绩令人瞩目。相应的，有关资本市场的理论研究也成为热点。但是，对中国资本市场发展进行全面、深入、系统地研究仍然较少。 文章选定《中国资本市场：进入管制与市场绩效》这一题目，是想探讨一下中国资本市场的一种特殊管制，即对企业进入资本市场所进行的管制。文章在批评、借鉴公共利益理论和政府管制经济理论的基础之上，针对中国资本市场进入管制的实际情况，提出了所谓的“资本配给”假说。这一假说认为，管制者通过对企业进入资本市场进行管制，企图把资本市场的资金导向国有企业、符合其产业政策目标的企业或其他企业。但是，分析表明，管制者所宣称的管制目标没有实现，中国资本市场的资本资源配置效率很低。文章的结构安排如下： 第一部分是引言。 第二部分介绍和评论了两种主要的关于市场管制的理论。这里介绍了公共利益理论、管制俘虏理论，并指出了这两种理论的缺陷和不足。由于中国市场机制的发育程度、政治体制、意识形态、消费者意识、法律法规等都与西方国家存在很大差异，这就使上述理论应用于中国有一定局限性。因此，研究中国资本市场必须从中国的实际出发。但是，上述理论仍然很有启发意义，尤其是管制俘虏理论，文章在具体的分析过程中多有借鉴。 第三部分检验了中国资本市场的绩效，尤其是进入管制对资本市场效率的影响。统计资料和分析表明，管制者所宣称的诸如支持国有企业改革、产业政策和保护投资者利益等目标并没有达到。而且，对企业进入资本市场的不适当管制损害了中国宝贵的资本资源的配置效率。 文章的第四部分对中国资本市场进入管制的实现机制作了分析。主要包括两方面内容：进入管制的条件和程序，以及进入管制条件和程序所带来的经济后果。进入管制的条件和程序主要包括以下几方面：关于申请上市公司规模及发行规模的规定、关于公司上市的盈利要求、强迫并购、其他进入条件和上市程序等。这些管制的经济后果是导致了所有制歧视(即非国有企业尤其是民营企业在进入资本市场方面处于严重不利地位)、合规成本和寻租成本高昂。 第五部分则对形成进入管制的原因（或管制的目标）做了探讨，并总结了文章所提出的“资本配给”假说的主要内容。分析表明，支持国有企业改革与提高资源配置效率和保护投资者利益之间是有冲突的。这些目标内生地决定了管制机构的设置和运做。管制措施的形式与经济后果以及管制的绩效。 第六部分对资本配给进行了扩展分析，主要是从三方面展开的：第一，资本配给的动态一般均衡分析。结论表明，资本配给肯定对资本市场的资源配置效率造成了损害；对国有企业改革的作用则是不确定的；对稳定的作用则具有两面性。管制者应当在效率、改革和稳定三者之间寻求一种动态的平衡。二级市场不稳定的重要原因在于大量绩差公司进入市场，削弱了市场稳定的价值基础。第二，资本配给具有财富再分配效应。第三，资本配给扭曲了市场机制，降低了市场效率。资本配给催生了大量的灰色交易，也迫使市场主体采取某些方式来规避政府管制。 最后一部分是结束语，对全文进行了总结。更多还原

【Abstract】 In the recent ten years the capital market of China has been developing very fast. And the theory on the development of capital market began to be prosperous . But it is in need of the all-romuL systemic and deep research on the development of capital market of China.In order to analyse the regulation on the enterprises’ entry into capital market the author chooses the theme capital market of China: the regulaion on the entry and the market effects . China’s regulation is special because in most countries the emphasis of regulation is put on the operation of capital market and the financial organizitions’ entry into capital market. The enterprises of China can not enter the capital market freely . The main goal of the regulation is to provide more fund for the State-Ownership Enterprises (SOEs) and support them to reform . After this goal was determined the government establish particular organizations and control the procedures of enterprises into capital market. Through a lot of pratical materials the author finds that the goals announced by the regulater don’ t come true and the efficiency of capital market of China is very low . Then the author puts up a theory of "capital allocation" which means that the regulator tries to let SOEs get more capital from the capital market through the regulation . The constructure of this article is as follows:The first part of the article is the introduction .The second part introduces several theories on market regulation . The author introduces the theory of public interest and economic theory of regulation including capture theory of regulation and life-cycle theory, and pionts out the defects of these theories . Because of the mechanism of market system of politics social idealogy consumer conciousness and law of China different from those of Western countries the above theories can not be applied to China absolutely . The author maintains that we must make the research on capital market according to the reality of China . Certainly, we can draw some useful lessons from these theories .In the third part we test the effect of capital market ofChina ,especially the influence of entry regulation on the efficiency of capital market. But the regulator do not achieve the goals , such as promoting the reform of SOEs the adjustment of industry constructure and protecting the investors , and the improper regulation has done damage to the efficiency of capital allocation .Then we talk about the mechanism of regulation .We analyse the measures of regulation and procedures which enterprises going into capital market must obay . Then we discuss the implication of the measures and procedures .In the fifth part we try to find the causes of the entry regulation and summarize the main content of the theory "capital allocation". In this part we put the emphasis on the three main goals of regulation : supporting the reform of SOEs improve the efficiency of resource allocation and protecting the investors . But the three goals are contradictory with each other . It is the three goals that determine the establishment and operation of regulation organization , the measures and charactenistics of regulation, and the effect of regulation .In the sixth part of the article the author enlarges the analysis of "capital allocation". In order to make a more meaning conclusion we should consider the special economic background of China and carry out a danymic general equilibrium analysis . The outhor believe that the capital market may be helpful to the reform of SOEs in theory . But we should not put much expectation on this function of capital market . The regulator should give more opportunities to private enterprises .A brief conclusion is summarized in the end of the paper .更多还原